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) Case No. 20090433 - CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to §78A-4-103(2)(j) UTAH CODE ANN. 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
(1) Did this Court erroneously affirm the trial court's judgment relating to the well 
lease when in the body of its opinion it specifically rejected the 1986 PSC order and 
opined that the lease should be interpreted according to its plain language? 
(2) Does the District Court have jurisdiction to amend a final order from a retired 
judge in order to prevent a manifest injustice when that order appears to be in conflict 
with the decision of an appellate court? 
(3) Should the Court of Appeals recall its mandate for the purpose of clarification 
where it upheld the validity of the well lease between the parties but rejected the 1986 
PSC order, thereby tacitly reversing the opinion of Judge Brian on that issue? 
This matter should be reviewed "de novo" under a clearly erroneous standard. 
State of Utah v. Pena (869 P.2d 932 UT1994). The issues were preserved at R. 2000-
2002; 2082-2087; 2108 etseq. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter involves a long-standing dispute between Hi-Country Estates 
Homeowners Association (" Association") and Foothills Water Company, a Utah 
corporation, J. Rodney Dansie, The Dansie Family Trust, Richard P. Dansie, Joyce M. 
Taylor, and Bonnie R. Parkin (the "Dansie Group") relating to the delivery of water and 
the utilization of a water system in the Hi-Country Estates development located in 
southwest Salt Lake County. The case has an extensive history going back to 1985. It 
2 
has produced six appellate court opinions to date.1 Although the history of the case is 
long, this appeal is narrow and relates only to an apparent contradiction in the most recent 
decision of the Court in this matter (2008 UT App 105). The Dansie Group believes that 
there is an inconsistency between the language in the opinion of this Court, finding that 
the 1986 PSC order had been vacated and that the well lease between the parties is valid, 
and its failure to relieve the Dansie Group from the payment obligations imposed on them 
by Judge Brian based upon the 1986 PSC order. In f s 12-14 of its opinion, this Court 
rejected the argument of the Association that the contract between it and the Dansie 
Group violated public policy or was unconscionable. This Court stated that the 
Association's reliance on the 1986 PSC order was improper because the Association was 
no longer a public utility and that neither the statutes nor the PSC order were currently 
applicable to the Association. In footnote 2 of the opinion, this Court stated: 
"In addressing the breach of contract claim, the trial court determined 
that the Association was required to provide the water 'only upon payment of 
the [Dansies1] pro rata share of the Association's cost for power, chlorination, 
1
 Hi-Countiy Estates Homeowners Ass'nv. Bagley & Co., 863 P.2d 1 (UTApp. 1993). 
Hi-Countiy Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Bagley & Co., 901 P.2d 1017 (UT 1995). 
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Bagley & Co., 928 P.2d 1047 (UT App. 
1996). 
Hi-Countiy Estates Homeowners Assfn v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 305 (UT 
1996). 
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Assrnv. Bagley & Co., 2000UT27, 996P.2d534. 
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'nv. Bagley & Co., 2008 UTApp 105,182P.3d 
417. 
3 
and water testing,' and that the Association was required to provide the water 
connections 'only if the [Dansies] pa[id] the Association for those connections 
at the Association's usual charge for such connection.' The court reasoned that 
such payment by the Dansies was required because '[t]he 1986 PSC Order 
prohibits the Well Lease from affecting the rates paid by . . . the association 
members.' 
"On February 5, 1996, the PSC revoked the status of the water syslem 
as a public utility. Therefore, from that point forward, the PSC did not have 
jurisdiction over the water system, see Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 (2000), and 
the 1986 PSC order was no longer binding. Thus we now interpret the 
Dansies' rights and obligations under the Well Lease according to its plain 
language, which, as amended, states: 
'Dansie shall have the right to receive up to five (5) residential hook-ups 
on to the water system on the Dansie property for members of his 
immediate family without any payment of hook-up fees and shall 
further have the right to receive up to 12 million (12,000,000) gallons 
of water per year from the combined water system at no cost for 
culinary and yard irrigation use . . . .f 
The Well Lease also provides: 'Dansie shall further have the right to receive 
up to fifty (50) residential hook-ups onto the water system on the Dansie 
property for which no hook-up fees will be charged." 
4 
In spite of that language, this Court affirmed Judge Brian's order and final 
judgment dated January 5, 2006, although Judge Brian had relied on the PSC order in 
determining that the Dansie Group had to pay various costs for transporting the water 
through the Association's system and for the connections. 
The Supreme Court denied certiorari and the matter was returned to the District 
Court and assigned to Judge Roth due to Judge Brian's retirement. The Dansie Group 
asked Judge Roth to modify Judge Brian's final ruling to reflect the Court of Appeals' 
language in ^ 12 of its opinion. Judge Roth refused to do so based on his belief that he 
had no such authority since the Court of Appeals had affirmed Judge Brian's order in all 
respects. Judge Roth noted, however, that there was an apparent inconsistency between 
the Court of Appeals' statements in ]^ 12 and its reference to footnote 2 that the well lease 
is enforceable as written, and Judge Brian's order that required the Dansie Group to pay 
for transfer fees and costs based upon the defunct 1986 PSC order. The Dansie Group 
appeals from Judge Roth's order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case began over thirty years ago with a well lease and water line extension 
agreement that was executed between Jessie Dansie, the owner of several wells, and 
Gerald Bagley who was the operator of the water system for the Hi-Country Estates 
Homeowners Association. In 1977 Mr. Dansie and Mr. Bagley signed a well lease that 
gave Mr. Bagley the right to obtain water from the Dansie's wells for use in the 
Association's water system (Addendum 1). The well lease gave Mr. Dansie the right to 
5 
receive reasonable amounts of water from the water system, through five residential 
hook-ups for members of his immediate family, without paying hook-up fees. It also 
provided the right to receive up to 50 additional hook-ups to the water system for which 
no hook-up fees would be charged. In June of 1985, the Foothills Water Company, which 
had then taken over the operation of the water system, applied to the PSC to operate as a 
public utility and for an order approving its rates. On July 3, 1985, Mr. Bagley and Mr. 
Dansie amended the well lease to clarify some language in it and to add the following 
provisions: 
(1) The Dansies shall have the right to receive up to 12,000,000 
gallons of water per year from the combined water system at no cost, for culinary and 
irrigation use. 
(2) The Dansies shall have the right to use any excess water from well number 
one (one of the wells subject to the water lease agreement) that is not being used by Mr. 
Bagley or by customers of Hi-Country Estates (Addendum 2).2 
Also in 1985, the Association filed suit to quiet title in the water system serving 
the Association which was still being operated at that time by the Foothills Water 
Company. That was the first legal action filed in this matter. 
In 1986, the PSC issued an order establishing interim rates and granting a 
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity to the Foothills Water Company. The present 
2
 Mr. Dansie was obligated only to pay the incremental pumping power costs 
associated with producing the excess water. 
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effect of that order is the focus of this appeal. Besides setting rates for providing water to 
the Association residents at that time, the order criticized the well lease agreement 
between Mr. Dansie and Mr. Bagley, concluding that its provisions for providing 
12,000,000 gallons annually and 55 hook-ups free of charge were improper because they 
required the Association to bear the costs of the well lease. Ten years later, however, the 
PSC revoked its jurisdiction over the Association's water system and cancelled its 
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity, thus terminating its prior order (Addendum 3). 
In various orders and appellate opinions during the pendency of this case, the 
validity and enforceability of the well lease has been consistently upheld. In fact, this 
court determined over ten years ago that the well lease was valid.3 
In 2006, almost ten years after the PSC order was terminated, Judge Brian entered 
a final judgment in this action (Addendum 4; R. 1764-1773). In that judgment, despite the 
plain language of the well lease that allowed the Dansie Group free hook-ups and free 
water, Judge Brian made three findings regarding the well lease that are relevant to this 
appeal: (1) the well lease was valid and enforceable and not void as against public policy 
or because it was unconscionable; (2) the PSC's 1986 order prohibited the well lease 
from affecting the rates paid by the Association's members; and (3) in order to receive its 
12,000,000 gallons of water and its 55 additional connections, the Dansie Group must pay 
3
 In Hi-Country v. Bagley, 928 P.2d 1047, (UT App. 1996), this Court stated "We affirm 
.. .the district court's ruling that the well lease agreement is a valid encumbrance on the subject 
water system." 
7 
its pro rata share of the costs for power, chlorination and water testing, "fair use" 
transportation fees, and the cost of each connection. 
Judge Brian's judgment was appealed to this Court which upheld the well lease 
agreement as valid and enforceable (Addendum 5; R. 1936-1961). This Court also held 
that because the 1986 PSC order was no longer applicable, the well lease must be 
interpreted according to its plain language. The specific reasoning of the Court is found 
in f 12, and in footnote 2, of its opinion. The plain language of the well lease provides 
that the Dansie Group has the right to receive up to five residential hook-ups for members 
of the immediate family without paying hook-up fees and further has the right to receive 
up to 12,000,000 gallons of water per year from the combined water system at no cost for 
culinary and yard irrigation. The well lease also provides that the Dansie Group has the 
right to receive up to 50 residential hook-ups onto the water system for use on the Dansie 
Group's property for which no hook-up fees shall be charged. In spite of the fact that 
Judge Brian relied upon the PSC order in assessing costs for the irrigation water against 
the Dansie Group and that this Court determined that the PSC order was no longer 
applicable, this Court nevertheless concluded: 
"We affirm the trial court's holding that the well lease is an enforceable 
contract, being neither void as against public policy nor unconscionable. We further 
affirm the dismissal of the Dansie's breach of contract claims; specifically, we affirm 
the trial court's determination that Dansies did not prove damages proximately 
caused by the separation of the water systems. As to the issue 
8 
regarding the amount awarded as reimbursement lor improvements, we see no 
error in the trial court's reliance on the PSC finding and at him this aw aid \\ v 
tin IN loi ( illi 1 lln I Il i mi il II mi in i 11 mpha is added) 
Foi some icason, this Couit did not mention the effect oi the PSC order in its 
conclusion, thus leaving the parties and the trial court to speculate as to whether (his Court 
intended to hold lhat tin Dansic (noup is sliill obligated wiidei Judge Biian's ruling to pay 
for the water and HM IIOMI up lln Mniai * uonp did n it >t i *K ir\ irw ol lln dn ision by 
filing a petition for a rehearing. Rather, aftei the case was returned to the District Court 
following a denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court, the Dansic Group filed a motion with 
Jin) M l\ull) In nil idib IIHDI I H hm |ml< nil ill to idle* t (In app.n nl ilot i ion ! if Ihis < out! 
that the contract was enforceable but was not subject to the PSC order (Addendum 6, R. 
2000-2002). Judge Roth refused to modiT\ Judge Brian's order based on his belief that he 
had no such autiiont) since the I onit ol Appeals had alhimed Judge linaii's oidti "on all 
i suoi " Indue Roth nolrd howovei llnl tin n w AS an appnn i l 11u onsistonn between tin 
Court of Appeals' statements in [^ 12 and its reference m footnote 2 that the well lease is 
enforceable as written, and Judge Brian's order that required payment bv the Dansie Group 
i Mi insler fees and u>,I in an md un r nlh lln ll>X6PM ooloi Iikh'e Rolh 1 > I tin 
extraordinary step of modifying his order b> interlineation (Addendum 7; R. 2082-2087) 
and also incorporating into his order his ruling from the bench at the hearing (Addendum 8; 
k J i nx U)-3K) bulge Roll) ob »n\ id Ilul ml u s possihli Ih it the ( otiil I Appi i Is «hi I mil 
realize the implication oi aiiiiniing on all issues given tin natiiK ol the anal\si . that it 
9 
made in ^ 12 of its opinion but that he couldn't say that was the case. Judge Roth raised the 
question of what process was available in order to remedy the apparent contradiction. The 
Dansie Group filed this appeal as one of the possible vehicles available to it to resolve the 
apparent conflict. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
By affirming Judge Brian "on all issues," this Court failed to apply its own holding 
that the well lease was to be interpreted according to its plain language free of any 
restrictions caused by the 1986 PSC order. 
The trial court has the right to amend Judge Brian's order in order to prevent 
manifest injustice and should have done so. 
This Court has the inherent power to recall its mandate in order to provide 
clarification and to address inconsistencies contained in its ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
IT APPEARS THAT THIS COURT ERRONEOUSLY AFFIRMED JUDGE BRIAN "ON 
ALL ISSUES" WITHOUT FOLLOWING ITS RULING ON THE EFFECT OF THE 1986 
PSC ORDER. 
Three issues relating to the well lease that are relevant to this appeal were presented 
to this Court for review: (1) Is the lease valid? (2) Did the PSC have the power to construe 
the well lease relating to its affect on the Association's rates? and (3) Are the Dansies 
required to pay the Association for the 12,000,000 gallons of water and the 55 hook-ups? 
10 
To these questions this Court apparently answered "yes," "no," a:-J "no." I Iowever, Judge 
Brian had answered "yes," "yes," and "_u.-,." (Compare Addenui. ; :\ .
 ( 
Addei ldi n i i 1, ] )p 3 1.) 
The Dansie Group has no quarrel with this Court's affirmance of the other issues 
raised on the previous appeal; however, by affirming Judge Briaii "on al\ i^ue^ Iln- * ourl 
appears to have erroneous!} sa • • • a-.N • an--' '* -^- tsaia 
,,, .^  : . .;: LiC)Lirict 1986 PSC order although this Court specifically held that the 
order was no longer valid. It tlins appears that this Court's affirmance "on all issues" was in 
error and that the portion e iikiue HI uuvs order assessing costs tn . i \ :i: .:,. i . ad 
!*^ « -Mdi'- • ; reversed 
II 
'i 111*. ' M M ' : : : ; \ • . '. i :: , • ' • ' • , • , . ! • H j . U - >. - >i< >I f' : \ 
U P n n ? Tr)i>Rl:\hN'I \1 ^M'-hSl lNJUSilCh ANDSHuLiLD HAVE DONE SO 
Judge Roth recognized the conflict between this Court's mandate and its statements 
that the 1986 PSC order was terminated and that the piam language of the well lease sli./.iiu 
i on li nl I lo\ve\ t in In Irlf i i MMrniiied to h illuw tin1 ' |i n I language of I lie ma ml ah*. 
But, a trial court may deviate from the strict language of a remand in ordci to pre. cut a 
grave injustice. See, In re: Commonwealth, 146 Pa. Commw. 414, 606 A. 2d 563 (Pa. 
I ommu ! W'» • •; ..: . i :. . ^ lo • •,. , v =i. 
i eqi lired, i inder appropi late en ci in istance, the trial court n my act to prevent an injustice. 
11 
Indeed a trial court should act in accordance with both the mandate and the result 
contemplated in the opinion. Frost v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 813 S.W.2d 302 (Mo. 
1991). The Dansie Group submits that the result contemplated here by this Court was that 
the plain language of the well lease should control and that the Dansie Group should get the 
12,000,000 gallons and 55 hook-ups free of charge. Therefore, the trial court should have 
modified Judge Brian's order to accomplish that result. See also, The Navajo Nation v. The 
United States of America, 68 Fed CI. 805, 2005 U.S. Claims LEXIS 377 (trial court must 
implement both the letter and the spirit of the mandate). 
Ill 
THIS COURT HAS THE INHERENT POWER TO RECALL ITS MANDATE IN 
ORDER TO PROVIDE CLARIFICATION 
Throughout this case, Judge Brian consistently held that the well lease was valid and 
enforceable. In 1996 this Court agreed.4 At that time, however, the question of the PSC's 
order requiring the Dansie Group to pay for the water and hook-ups was not before this 
Court. But in the final judgment entered by Judge Brian in 2006, although he once again 
found that the well lease agreement was valid and binding, he relied upon the 1986 PSC 
order and required the Dansie Group to pay for the water and the hook-ups. Almost ten 
years previously, however, the PSC had withdrawn its jurisdiction over the matter, thus 
nullifying its 1986 order. Nevertheless, Judge Brian ordered the Dansie Group to pay for 
4
 Hi-Country v. Bagley, 928 P.2d 1047, (UT App. 1996). 
12 
the wa te r and the h o o k - u p s . On appea l , this Cour t again u p h e l d the val id i ty oi the well 
lease . It also held that the P S C order , w h i c h wa^ the ba>- for Judge Brian 's a s s e s s m e n t o f 
cos ts and i ees i m :1 :a tl IC \ ve II 1c ai ;c , was i IC loi lger applicable 1 1 ii; ; ( '< >m f r u vfed tl i. it Ji idge 
Brian's order was based on the 1986 PSC order. 1his Com t also noted thai the PSC order 
was revoked on February 5, 1996, and that therefore, "from that point forwu ' ''u PSC 
did not ha ve j in isdiction over the water system , and the 1' :)K6 PSC oi de r was no 
I o n p e it b i ini d 11 i p ' ( \ d d e n d i i n I 5 ; ) | 12) (I: i i n p 1 I a t ; i s a d < 1 e d ) I I t i: ; ( " o i 11 t w e 111 o i i t o s t a te t h a t, 
"We now interpret the Dansie's rights and obligations under the Well lease according to its 
plain language . " ^i--4 bnguage provided that the Dansie's had the right \o 12,000,000 
gallons of walei . i . ie-10 ': . 
the water system for which no hook-up foes could be charged. In its conclusion, this Court 
affirmed "the trial court's liolding that the well lease is an enforceable contract" biit did not 
articulate in its conclusion me wu; .n;., Judge Brian-- ord,: requiring paymeni M ;ic waier 
i . ' • • • . , . . • • ^ • - , P N I . . . 
longer binding." This Court went on i- a i l i i^ Judge Brmn'b rulings on other isbL.s thai die 
not relevant to this appeal and then concluded, "We therefore affirm the trial court on all 
issues." 
Based upon Judge Roth's refusal to modify Judge Brian's judgment to coniply with 
the language of this Court's opinion, tlle Dansies are left with a contract that both the trial 
coin (; c.!! id tl lis Coi n t d e e n led to be va l id ai id i ;i d ncl i this Com t has stated si lould be 
interpreted by its plain langiuuv I * . .ipnaee :•> .u'-i 
13 
order by Judge Brian requiring payments based upon an order from the PSC that is no 
longer binding. 
This Court has the inherent power to correct a mistake on remand even after the 
Supreme Court has denied certiorari. See State of Colorado v. McAfee, 160 P.2d 277, 2007 
Colo. App. LEXIS 96. In that case the court, quoting Bryant v. Ford Motor Co. 886 F.2d 
1526, 1529 (9th Cir. 1989), noted that an appellant court has the inherent power to recall its 
mandate to prevent injustice but that the power should be used "sparingly" and only in 
"exceptional circumstances." The court determined that the power to recall was inherent 
and that no statute or rule authorizing such action was necessary since an appellant court 
has inherent power in matters relating to the exercise of its own jurisdiction. 
In American Iron and Steel Inst. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 560 F.2d 589 
(3d Cir. 1977), the court provided an exhaustive analysis of the power of an appellate court 
to recall a mandate and determined that "it is well recognized that a court of appeals has 
such authority." Id. 594. The court concluded that all courts of appeal have emphasized 
that the recall of a mandate is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly and 
only for "good cause" or to "prevent injustice" or in "special circumstances." "Good cause" 
exists to justify the recall of a mandate where the clarification of a mandate and opinion is 
critical. Id. See also, Greater Boston Television Corp. v. Federal Communications 
Commission, 463 F.2d 268, (D.C. Cir. 1971). (An appellate court likewise has continuing 
power to accept and pass upon a petition to clarify an outstanding mandate.) The courts 
14 
recognize the need for finality but also recognize thai )\\ •• .a turn i :reumstances, in the 
interest of justice and for good cause, a mandate may be recalled and iihu;iiu\; he iirant 
I ( ;j i |/| j | l I !,% j | 1 1 | |
 {11 i{ I i | | n i i I  I  I i n • i ! i | i l l I I If II | I i l l l i t i I I  l i l t I I I I I l i t w I l l I III I \\ l i l t 1 1 I II II, III 
discretion must be exercised. See Masinter v. Tenneco Oil Co., 934 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 
1991). (The court could recall a mandate to prevent an injustice over two years after it had 
been issued.) 
• •• . . . huiiiuauon oi this Court's maiidate is critical. A great injustice 
will be done to the Dansie Group unless the mandate of this Court is recalled and ^ 
modified to confonn willi its holding relating to the applicability • -i ihe i VM> !"- .w.-er 
( Mfn t w ise. (he I Jaihie * if i nip \ ill br loin r\ \i\\Ui]-* ' ]"- rH<vK 
Judge Brian's judgment) at a significant cost. Such a result would completely eviscerate 
the 'plain language" of the well lease that this Coiirt has deemed to be controlling on the 
issue. 
CONCLUSION 
rI'his Appeal relates only to the issue of the effect of the PSC order (as interpreted 
o\ Judge lirian^ on ilk well lease. 
I! appeal . Mini fhr- t Mini iiiitiji" <i iiiiN'liikr in i/onlii niniL' ludtie Bnan "on all i\Mir\ 
and failed to realize that by doing so, this Court approved that part of Judge Brian's order 
requiring the Dansie Group to pay for the water and hook-ups based on i;ie deli.nc: PSC 
oi der. 
Judge Roth was unsure about how to raise this issue. So is the Dansie Group. 
This appeal was filed to preserve the rights of the Dansies to raise this matter before this 
Court. 
If this Court determines that in spite of U 12 and footnote 2 of its order, it really 
intended the Dansie Group to be forever subject to the effects of the defunct PSC order, 
then this matter is concluded. If, however, the Court intended ^J12 and footnote 2 to 
control and for the Dansie Group to receive the water and hook-ups as the lease directs, 
the Dansie Group has presented two possible routes to correct this mistake. Assuming 
that a mistake was made, the Dansie Group urges this Court to use its inherent power to 
right the wrong, or to provide guidance to the Dansie Group on how to do it, or to remand 
to the trial court with instructions to modify Judge Brian's judgment by eliminating those 
portions that require the Dansie Group to pay for the water and the hook-ups. 
DATED this ^ _ day of November, 2009. 
J. Thomas Bowen 
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ADDENDUM 1 
V \ ' •! : i • • • i ' w •' 7 
WELL LEASE AND WATER LINE EXTENSION AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into this / ^ - d a y of April, 
1977, by and between JESSIE H. DANSIE, hereinafter referred to as r 
"Dansie", and GERALD H. BAGLEY, hereinafter referred to as "Bagley", 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, Dansie is the owner of property located in Sections 
33, 34 and 35, Township 3 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, and is also the owner of water rights evidenced by 
Certificate No. 8212 Application No. 264 51, and the rights to 
water therefrom and a water distribution system located on such 
property; and 
WHEREAS, 'Bagley is the owner of property located in Section 
33, Township 3 South, Range 2 West, and Sections 1, 2, 4, 5, and 
11, Township 4 South, Range 2 West Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
and is also the owner of a water distribution system located on 
part of the property owned by hira; and 
WHEREAS, Dansie and Barley desire to connect their water 
systems and make use of the Dansie well and water for their 
mutual benefit, upon the terms and conditions provided herein; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants 
hereinafter provided, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
A. WELL LEASE 
1. Dansie hereby leases to Bagley the well located South 
758 Feet and East 1350 Feet from the West quarter corner of 
Section 33, Township 3 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, identified by Certificate No. 26451 issued by the Utah 
State Engineer's Office, hereinafter referred to as "Dansie Well 
No. lw, including the equipment for operation of such well and the 
rights to all of the water therefrom, for a period of ten (10) 
years from the date of this Agreement. 
EXHIBIT A 
000S3 
2. Bagley shall pay to Dansie Five Thousand One Hundred 
Dollars ($5,100.00) the ieceipt of which is hereby acknowledged, 
and as rental for such lease, Bagley shall pay to Dansie $300.00 
each month during the first fj^ve years of this lease commencing 
April 10, 1977, provided the monthly rental shall be increased to 
$600.00 per month at such time as thirty (30) additional hook-ups 
are installed on the Hi-Country Water Company Distribution System 
operated by Bagley. As of the date of this Agreement, there are 
28 hook-ups, such hook-ups being detailed m JBxhibit II. 
3. Commencing April 10, 19B2, the monthly rental payments 
shall be increased to $600.00 per month unless they have already 
been increased to that amount pursuant to Paragraph 2 above 
4. Bagley shall have the right to renew this Well Crease on 
terms to be agreed to by Bagley and Dansie at the termination of 
this Lease on April 10, 1987. 
5. Bagley agrees to provide and install a seal around the 
well pipe of Dansie Well No. 1 as required to meet the Utah State 
Division of Health standards and to install a new pump on the 
well within the first five (5) years of this lease and shall be 
responsible for all maintenance of Dansie Well No. 1 during the 
term of this lease. 
<>. Bagley agrees to pay all pumping costs, repairs, and 
maintenance of said well for the period of this Agreement. Bagley 
agrees to maintain the said well< and electric motor in good 
operating condition- Any changes or modifications to said well, 
motor and pumping equipment shall be paid for by Bagley and will 
become the property of Dansie at the termination of this Agreement. 
7. The existing pump, electric motor and transformers will 
remain the property of Dansie and will be delivered to Dansie if 
removed from said well. Any new equipment to be installed in 
said well such as an electric motor, pumps and transformers and 
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piping shall become the property of Dansie and shall be free and 
clear of any mortgages, liens or encumbrances at the termination 
of this Agreement. 
8. Bagley agrees for himself, his successors, and assigns 
to be responsible for and to indemnify Dansie, his successors 
and assigns, against any and all liability, losses and damages, 
of any nature whatever, and charges and expenses, including court 
costs and attorneys* fees that Dansie may sustain or be put to 
and which arise out of the operations, rights and obligations of 
Bagley pursuant to this Agreement whether such liability, loss, 
damage charges or expenses are the result of the actions or 
omraissions of Bagley, his employees, agents Or otherwise. 
9. Dansie does not warrant that the water from Dansie Well No. 
does now or at any time during the terro of this Agreement, and any 
extension thereof, will meet any standards for culinary water as 
required by the tJtah State Division of Health. However, a letter 
of approval of the water by the tJtah State Board of Health is 
attached (Exhibit $2) and the requirements are set forth in said 
letter. 
B. EXTENSION^NO. 1 
1. Within one year from the date hereof, Dansie shall with 
his equipment perform all labor required to excavate for and 
install a 6-inch P.V.C. Class 20X) pipeline connecting the Dansie 
Well No. 1 to the existing Hi^-Country Water Company water system 
owned by Bagley at a point in Lot 19 as referenced by the map in 
Exhibit II. Bagley shall purchase and furnish all permits, pipe, 
materials and supplies required for this connection and shall 
obtain an easement across Lot #9 at his expense. 
2. Dansie shall own the line upon completion of the work 
and Bagley shall be able to use said line during the terro of this 
Agreement. Bagley shall have a right to enter the property 
upon which the pipeline and connection is located for the purpose 
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of installing, maintaining and using tne water line to be installed 
thereon pursuant to Paragraph B {1) above- Bagley hereby grants 
and conveys to Dansie an easement -and right-of-way over and 
across property in the Hi-Country Estate Subdivision for the same 
purpose. Dansie shall have a right to take water from the line at 
points that may serve the property along the line of Extension 
No. 1. Dansre shall own and Bagley will be responsible for 
maintenance of the extension during the life of this Agreement. 
C. EXTENSION NCK 2 
1. Within one year 'from the date hereof, Dansie shall, with 
his equipment and at hi«s expense/ perform all labor required to 
excavate for and install a 6-inch P.V.C. Class 200 pipelj ne 
connecting the Hi-Country Estates Water Company water system, 
from its most Ea-sterly point at approximately 7 350 West and 13300 
South in Salt bake County, to the Dansie water line at approximately 
7200 West and 1336Q South, including a pressure-reducing valve at 
the point of connection with the Hi-Country Estates Watei Company 
system at 7 350 West 13300 Souths Dansie shall purchase and 
furnish all pipe, materials and supplies required for thas connection. 
2. Dansie shall obtain and provide all easements and permits 
and pay all fees required for this connection and extension, except 
as for such line that may be on property of -Hi-Country Homeowners 
Association or Bagley, 
3. Dansie shall own and be responsible for all maintenance 
of this Extension No, 2. 
4. Bagley shall have the right, at all times during the 
term of this Agreement or any extension thereof, to run water from 
the Hi-Country Estates Water Company system through the Dansie 
water system and Extension Wo. 1 and No. 2 and No* 3 to property 
owned by Bagley in Sections 1, 2, and 11, Township 4 South, Range 
1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
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D. EXTENSION NO. 3 
1. Within one year from the date hereof, Dansie shall, with 
his equipment perforin all labor required to excavate for and 
install a 6-inch P.V.C. Class 200 pipeline connecting to the 
Dansie water system at 6800 West and 13000 South in Salt Lake 
County and extending along 6800 West to 13400 South, Dagley shall 
purchase and furnisli all permits, pipe, materials and supplies 
required for this connection and extension. 
2. Dansie shall own and Bagley shall be responsible for all 
maintenance £>f thi^ Extension No. 3 during the life of this Agreement. 
E. OTHER WEJLI>S AND HOOK-UPS 
1- Dansie shall have the right, at his expense, to connect 
any additional wells owned by -him, located in Section 33, 34 and 35, 
Township 3 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian identified 
by Certificate No. issued by the Utah State Engineers 
Office, hereinafter referred to as "Dansie Wells" and by change 
application No. 9-8635 (59-3879) issued by the Utah State Engineers 
Office, hereinafter referred to as "Dansie Well No. 3," to the 
water system_owned by Dansie, including Extension No. 2, and to 
commingle the water—troro tneserwens wita tnat m tne system-Tronr 
qther sources so long <ns the water from such wells at all times 
»eet all standards for culinary water required by the Utah State 
Division of Health~ 
2. Dansie shall have the right to receive up to five (5) 
residential hopk-ups onto the water system on the Dansie property 
for members of his immediate family without any payment of hook-up 
fees and shall further have the right to receive reasonable amounts 
of water from the system through these five (5) hook-ups for 
culinalry and yard irrigation at no cost, 
3, Dansie shall further have tfte right to receive up to fifty 
(50) residential hook-ups onto the water system on the Dansie 
property for which no hook-up fees will be charged. Water service 
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chaige^ shall be charged "to the ^ recipients 'the^ r^ oT_oT"v^ T5"cli 
Dansie shall receive fifty percent (50%) of the water service 
billings paid by those recipients in consideration for Dansie*s 
maintenance of his part of the water system. 
4* Dansie shall receive not less than $4,000.00 or One 
Hundred percent (100%) of all of the hook-up fees to the water 
system on the Leon property located between the Hi-Country Estates 
property in Sections 33, Township 3 South, Range 2 West, and the 
Dansie property in Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 2 West, 
Salt bake Base and Meridian a^nd shall receive fifty percent (50%) 
of the revenues from water service charges to such property. 
5. Dansie shall have the right to use for any purposes and 
at ho cost, any excess water from the Hi-Gountry Estates Water 
Company system Well No. JL, not required or being used by Bagley 
or customers of the Hi-Country Estates Water Company. Any power 
or other costs of pumping such excess water shall be paid by 
F. MISCELLANEOUS 
1. It is understood that Bagley Intends to use the entire 
water ^ system formed by the extensions and connections pfiDvided^^for" 
herein, including the present systems owned by Bagley and Dansie, 
for the purpose of providing water to users in the area covered 
by this system or which can be reached by extensions and connections 
-to this system, that Bagley intends to charge hook-up and water 
service fees to water users, thai: Bagley is entitled to all such 
fees and other charges except as otherwise provided in this 
Agreement, and that Bagley is responsible for all costs of other 
extensions and connections except as otherwise provided in this 
Agreement. 
2* Dansie agrees that Bagley may form a water company, using 
such entity or form of organization as Bagley desires, and may 
convey all his rights to the water system referred to in this 
Agreement and assign his interest in this Agreement to any such 
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entity or organization. Bagley wxll ne personally responsible 
for lease terms and conditions if assignee fails to meet the 
terms and conditions of the lease. No assignment, conveyance or 
sublease shall release Bagley from liabilities and obligation 
under this Agreement. 
3. Dansie further agrees that Bagley may apply to the Utah 
Public Service Commission for such permits or approvals as may be 
required and Dansie shall cooperate fully in all respects as may 
be required to obtain such permits or approvals as may be required 
by the^ Public Service Commission, Bagley agrees to pay all costs 
incurred in obtaining such approval, including but not limited to, 
legal and engineering fees. 
4. Bagley and Dansie each agree to execute and deliver any 
additional documents and/or easements which may be necessary to 
carry out the provisions and intent of this Agreement. 
5. Non-payment of any monthly installment will, at the 
option of Dansie, automatically terminate this Agreement- All 
remaining lease payments, in the event of termination for non-
payment of any monthly installment, shall become immediately due 
and payable to Dansie. If it becomes necessary £or~Dansie~~to sue 
for the liquidated damages (remaining lease payments) , Bagley 
shall pay attorneys* fees and costs incurred by Dansie. 
6. Dansie shall have first right of refusal to purchase 
the entire Hi-Country water system if it is to be sold or assigned 
to a third party, 
7. Bagley, and his assigns or successors, agree to supply 
water to the Dansie property as provided for in this Agreement and 
for such time beyond the expiration or termination of this Agreement 
as water is supplied to any of the Hi-Country properties or that the 
lines and water system referred to in this Agreement are in existence 
and water is being supplied from another source such as Salt Lake 
County Conservancy District. Such water as is provided subsequent 
- 7 -
Aflfl^ 
t;o tbe~expxiaXlLt3n~\>x teliminau^on ~of^  this Agreement shall he »adc 
available upon the same terms, conditions and rates as are set 
forth xn this Agreement. 
DATBD this y/7~ day of April, 1977. 
n 
/JESSIE H. DANSIE 0* 
-8-
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ADDENDUM 2 
EXTENSION OF WELL LEASE, 1985 
AMENDMENT TO WELL LEASE JLHD WATER LINE EX-TENSION AGREEMENT 
J 
This Amendment made and entered into this jr_^- c^y 
of July, 1965, by and between Jesse H. Dansie, hereinafter 
referred to as "Dansie," and Gerald H. Bagley, hereinafter 
referred to as *Bagley." 
W I T N E S S E T H 
WHEREAS, Dansie and Bagley, on April 7, 1977, entered 
into a Well Lease and Water Line Extension Agreement (herein-
after "Well Lease Agreement*); and 
WHEREAS, Dansie and Bagley are concerned about 
possible ambiguities in Paragraph E, 2. of the Well Lease 
Agreement; and 
WHEP.EAS, the Hi-Gountry Estates Homeowners Association 
has filed n lawsuit based in part on.interpretation of the Well 
Lease Agreement; and 
WHEREAS/ Bagley is delinquent in the payment of his 
monthly rental payments, but desires 'to continue the Well Lease 
Agreement; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of $10.00 (Ten) and 
other good and valuable consideration, the sufficiency of which 
is hereby admitted, Dansie and Bagley agree as follows: 
1. Paragraph E, 2. of the April 7, 1977 Well Lease 
Agreement, is amended to read as follows: 
2. Dansie shall have the right to receive 
up to five. (5) residential hook-ups on to 
the water system on the Dansie property for 
members of his immediate family without any 
payment of hook-up fees and shall further 
hav- tne right to receive up to 12 million 
<12,POG , GCQ } gaJLions of _ water per year from 
the combined water system at no cost for 
culinary and yard irrigation use on the 
Dansie property described herein plus Lot 51 
of Hi-Country Estates. Any meters required 
at any time by any person or entity for 
metering of- Dansie's water shall be 
purchased and installed by Bagley at no cost 
to Dansie. Any use of water for the fight-
ing of fires, or losses caused by breaks or 
line ruptures shall not be charged against 
the 12,000,000 gallons to which Dansie is 
otherwise entitled. 
2. Paragraph E.5. of the April 7, 1977 Well Lease 
Agreement is amended to read as follows: 
5. Dansie shall have the right to use for 
any purpose and at no cost, any excess water 
from the High Country Estates Water Company 
System Well No. 1, not required or being 
used by Bagley or customers of the High 
County Estates Water Company. Dansie shall 
p^ iy only the incremental pumping powejr cpsts 
associated with producing such excess water* 
3. All other provisions of the Well Lease Agreement 
shall Telnaln~i-n -jhHL-l-for-ce _^ und_e_f_f e_ct^  
4. Nothing herein shall relieve Bagley from th^ 
obligation to make the monthly payments now delinquent or to 
become due under the Well Lease Agreement. 
4. This Amendment and the Well Lease Agreement as 
amended herewith, shall be binding upon and inure to th^ e 
benefit of the respective parties hereto, their successors and 
*M>*V! 1313 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the -parties has caused 
this Amendment to be executed the day and year fxrst above 
written. 
/? 
VV^7 
/ 
a- r. 
J E S S I E DANSIE 
6985C 
GERALD H. BAGLEY 
ADDENDUM 3 
PSC ORDER, 1996 
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B2?OR£ TJ*2 PU3LXC SSRVICH COMMISSION CF UTAH -
• ^ 
-n trie Waiter of the Decertification) 
=>f HI~COUNTRY KCClaQWNSRS PHASE I ) 
VATER COMPANY, ) 
Respondent ) 
VOQ^r NO, 95z2195-n3 . 
RT-POftT frSD QRTER 
. o ::•-„',. f i cat e So, JZJL1Z 
T3fflrBD; F e b r u a r y <?, 1S=L£ 
SYNOPSIS 
Respondent was organised as a nonprofit, mutual water 
ccnpany; althougn it selves $6me non-members under contract:, it 
ioes not offer service to the public at large; consequently, we 
conclude it is exainpt frojn our juri3dicta.cn under S 54-2-2(29), UCA 
195 3 j ae amended. We thorefore cancel Respondent' G autnonty. 
Appearances: 
Laurie L. Ncda, Assistant 
Attorney General 
By the Commission: 
For Division of Public Util-
ities, Utah Pepartrr.ent o£ 
Commerce 
Pursuant to notice duly served, tods matter came on 
regularly for hearing che twenty-second day of January, 1996.. 
evidence wao- offered and received, and the Administrative Law 
J\3<lg&t having been fully advised in the premises, now enters the 
following Report, containing proposed FlndLingg or Factf Conclusions 
of Lav, and the Order has ad thereon. 
,«TNDTNfiS 0 ? FACT 
1. Respondent ds orgr&nized aa a nonprofit corporation 
providing service to its members. 
2. Rdapondafct Gervas a limitdd number of tionmeinbare pursuant 
to specific contracts however, it does ndt offer its 
<G Z> 
ZQHD'4 dve«ec> t c g / s c a a ss^aeef i t isa 
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sorvice to the public generally. 
3, P,espondsnt wid iea Coonmlsaion assistance in closing its 
books Cor 199 5 to ensure that its bookkeeping system is 
set up appropriately for a water company; cansequencly it 
wishes co deter finalizacion of decertification pending 
.the outcome oZ an audit by the Division of Public 
utilities. 
£QHCy.UgIPN5 OF IAW 
Respondent is outside our juriedictlon as established 
under £ S4-2*2(29); consequently, Respondeat* s Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity should be canceled. To accommodate 
Respondent's desire to ^mmra that it begins life as an unregulated 
entity with a proper boofclceapin£ system, the decertification order: 
should be interlocutory pending the outcome of an audit by the 
Division cf Public Utilities. 
flJSQES 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that : 
Certificate? of Convenience BJI& *fece/3slty No, 2737, issued 
to HI ^ COUNTRY ESTATES PHASE I WATER COMPANY, be, and it 
is, canceled and annulled, effective SIXTY (60) DAYS from 
the date or this Order, unleee, during oaid interim, 
based on an audit of said company's books, the Division 
of Public Utilities recommends a stay. 
Any parson aggrieved by this Order may petition the 
001120 
eoo*d <**€*«« To/at/eci aG/.»as3i<ae uoi«» tu«o-i *o«~.. 
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Cacumisslon far ravio* within 20 days of the dace of th~e 
Order, Failure so to do will forfeit the right to appeal 
to the Utah supreme Court -
DATED at Sale Lake City, Utah, this 5th day of February. 
T a 9 6 . 
A. Robert Thuntiaja 
Adjninie t ra txve Lav Judge 
Approved end Confirmed t h i s Sfch d^y of February, 199St a s 
che Report and o rder ot ihe p u b l i c Se rv i ce Commission of Utah . 
S tephens? . Mecljam, Chairman 
Constance B. White , Commissioner 
ii 
Clark ffr^piies, Commissioner 
A t t e s t : 
Jki2ie Orchard 
Commission Sec re t a ry 
001121 
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ADDENDUM 4 
FINAL JUDGMENT, 
JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN 
Douglas J Parry, #2531 
DaleR Gardiner, #1147 
PARRY ANDERSON & GARDINER 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411) 
Telephone- (801) 521-3434 
Fax:.(801) 521-3484 
Attorneys, for Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant 
JJN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
WEST J ORDAN D EPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
EQ-COUNTRY ESTATES HOlsffiOWNEItS 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Corporation, FINAL JUDGMENT 
PlaintiS, 
v. 
BAGLEY & COMPANY, et al., Case No 020107452 
Defendants. (Previous Case No. 850901464) 
FOOTHILLS WATER COMPANY, a Utah Honorable PAT B. BRIAN 
Corporation, 
Counter-claimant, 
v. 
HI-COUNTRY ESTATES HOlvEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Corporation, 
Counter-defendants. 
The aboYe-entttletl matter came'before the Court, the Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding, for 
trial on January 24-27, and February 1-2, and 16, 2005 Hi-Country Estates Homeowners 
Association (the "Association"), appeared through counsel, Douglas J. Parry and Dale F. Gardiner 
001764 
of PARRY ANDERSON iL GARDINER The Dansie Family 7 rust, whoso beneficiaries are J Rodney 
Dansie, Richard V Dansie Boyd W Dan^Joyce M Taylor, and Bonnie R. Parian (collectively, 
the "Dansies") appeared through counsel, Michael M Later of RooiCEk, LATER & RAWLINQS 
Foothills Water Compan} and J Rodney Dansie, individually, appeared through counsel, Val 
AntcsaL of PARSONS BEHLE & LATHVIER 
The Dansies, Foothills Water Company, and J. Rodney Dansie, individually, filed an 
Amended Counterclaim of J Rodney Dansie the Dansie Family Trust the Dansie Family Group and 
Foothills Water Company (the ^Counterclaim") The parties to the*Countercl aim were referred to 
at tnal, and are sometimes referred to collectively herein, as the "Plaintiffe^ as the context may 
require 
At tnal, the parties stipulated, and the Court certified, that the only issues remaining for tnal 
were 
1. is the Well Lease void as against public policy*? 
2. Did fee Dansies agree to pa} the cost of chlonnatioii, pumping, testing and 
transportation "costs" (pro rata, actual or incremental) of transporting their 
water through the Homeowners' Water System4? 
3. If the Dansies did agree, what are the "costs"' associated with transporting the 
water? 
4 If the Dansies agreed to pay the "costs" of transporting the water, what 
"damages7' did the Dansies sustain because the Homeowners refused/failed 
to transport water7 
See Issues Certified For Tnal, filed February 1, 2005 
Final Judgment 2 
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The Court enquired of the parties on numerous occasion** whether there were artyremainmg 
factual issuer for trial, it being the Court'fc intention to resolve the entire matter at -this tnal. The 
parties represented to the Court that the foregoing issues were the only issues remaining foi trial 
Upon conclusion 0/ the tnal, the Court took the matter under advisement and ordered the 
parties to simultaneous]}' file blind post-trial memoranda. The Association and the Dansies 
subsequently filed their post-trial memoranda on March 25, 2005. No post-trial memorandum was 
submitted by J. Rodney Dansie, individually, or by Foothills Water Company. 
After considering the testimony and exhibits presented at trial, the binding case history, the 
memoranda filed by the Association and the Dansies, and the applicable law, the Court issued its 
Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on May 319 2005. Basal upon 
the Court's May 31, 2005, Decision, the Court now enters the following Judgment and Order. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
1. The Well Lease is not void as against public policy.-Specifically, the Well Lease is 
not void based on Utah Code Anm §§ 54-3-8(1) and 54-3-1, the PSCTs 1986 Order, or the 
unconscionability doctrine The Well Lease is a valid and binding encumbrance on the Association's 
Water System. See Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass 1n v. Bagley & Co,, 901 P.2d 1017, 1023, 
[Utah 1995); see also Hi-County Estates Homeowners Ass 'n v. Bagley & Co,, 928P.2cf 1047 (Utah. 
CL App. 1996); May 17, 2001 Memorandum Decision, 
2. The PSC has the power to construe contracts affecting rate-maldng. Hi-Country 
Estates Homeowners Ass'n v Bagley & Co., 901 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Utah 1995). The 1986 PSC 
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Order prohibits the Well Lease from affecting the rates paid by the customers, i e , the Association 
members Id at 1023 
3. Under the Well Lease, the Dansjes art entitled to receive ] 2 million gallons of water 
per year, or such larger amount as the excess capacity of the Association's Water System will permit, 
only upon payment of their pro rata share of the Association's costs for power, chlonnation, and 
water testing Furthermore, all water transported outside of Hi-Countiy Estates is subject to a 'fair 
use*'transportation fee See May 17 2007 Memorandum Decision, p 5 See also October 31, 1990 
Order at2. Further, undenthe Well Lease, the Dansies are provided aright of first refusal to purchase 
the Association^ Water System and the right to receive 5f additional water connections from the 
Association, but only if the Dansies pay the Association foi those connections at the Association's 
usual charge for each such connection. 
4 The Association offered on several occasions to supply water to the Dansies if the 
Dansies would pay the same rate as other customers The Dansies refused to do so See November 
5, 200J Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 2. 
5. In March 1994, the Association was forced to discontinue supplying water .to the 
Dansies in order to comply with -the 1986 PSC Order. See November 5, 2001 Memorandum 
Decision and Order, p 2 Any damages suffered by the Dansies in not receiving the water they are 
entitled to under the Well Lease are not attributable to the Association Id p 5. 
6. The Dansies are entitled to receive water from Dansip Well No. 1 through the 
Association's Water System in accordance with the Well Lease only upon payment of fhe/?rc? rata 
costs ofbmxsporting the water through the Association's Water System See Memorandum Decision 
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Re: Hi'Country Estates Motion for Partial Summary^ Judgment lie: Damages for Costs of 
Transporting Water and Reimbursement for Water Lines, elated May 203 2003. 
7. The Dansies did not agree at any time to pay the costs of transporting water from 
Dansie Well No, 1 through the Association's Water System. Accordingly, (lie Association did not 
breach the Wet! Lease by disconnecting Dansie Well No. 1 from the Association's Water System. 
8. The appropriate measure of costs for transportation of "water from Dansie Well-No. 
1 through the Association's Water System is a pro rata sharp of .the Association's costs for 
transporting the water. 
9. Pro rata transportation costs are calculated by, taking the Association's -costs of 
operating the Association's entire Water System, subtracting the costs incurred by the Association 
to produce and treat the water from the Association's -well, and dividing that renrairnng amount by 
the number of gallons transported through the Association's Water System. 
TO. Based on this methodology, a reasonable pro rale transportation fee as of the time 
of trial is $3.-19 per thousand gallons of water. 
11. The Dansies have refused to pay any transportation fee for transporting .water from 
Dansie Well No. 1 through the Association's Water System. 
12. The Dansies failed to prove any damages proximately caused by the separation of the 
two water systems. The Dansies further failed to mitigate any other alleged damages. 
13. Accordingly, the Dansies have not sustained any damages attributable to the 
Association as a result of (he Association's separation of the two water systems. 
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14 In its Memorandum Decision dated July 2(, 2000, the Court reaffirmed its award of 
515,080 1 h m favor of Foothills Water Company for reimbursement-of taxtx paid by Foothills Water 
Company and further awarded Foothills Water Company pre-judgment interest m the sunn of 
3:20,986.58 on that award 
Based upon the foregoing, It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as 
follows 
i The First Cause of Acfoon of the Counterclaim, tcBreach of Covenant Running with 
the Property to Provide Reasonable Amounts of Water ior Dansie Fannfy Members (Specific 
Performance)" is hereby DISMISSED, no cause of action. The Dansies are entitled to receiye watsr 
from the Association's Water System only upon payment of the Dansies' pro rata share of the 
Association's costs of power, cWorinabon, water testing and transportation. 
2 The Second Canse-of Action of the Counterclaim, "Breach of Covenant Running with 
the Property to Provide Reasonable Amounts of Water for Dansie Family Members (Damages)" is 
hereby DISMISSED, no cause of action. 
3 The Third Cause of Action of the Counterclaim, "Wiolahon of Easement to Allow 
Water tobe Transported Through the Water System From the Dansie Wells (Specific Performance)7' 
is hereby DISMISSED, no cause of action. The Dansies are entitled to receive water from Dansie 
Well No 1 aad/or otherDansie wells through the Association's Water System only upon payment 
of the pro rata costs of transporting the Dansies' water through the Association's Water System, as 
determined by the operator of the Association's Water System (currently the Jordan Valley Water 
Conservancy District), using the methodology set forth above The Dansies may connect lmes from 
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Dansie wells to the Association's Water System only if those wells have a valid certification of 
acceptable water quality for each well from (he State of Utah, Department of Environmental Quality, 
Division of Dnnkmg Water. All water testing, monitoring, metering and billing shall be 
administered by the operator of the Association's Water System, currently the Jordan Valley Water 
Conservancy District TheDansies are responsible forpayment of all fees and costs associated with 
the certification and maintenance of acceptable water quality of the Dansie wells, including but not 
limited to Dansie Well No I. Finally, the Dansies must pay any costs incurred to reconnect the 
Dansie water system to the Association's Water System so that the Dansies5 service will not be 
subsidized b3' the existing customers of the Association's Water System. 
4. The Fourth Cause of Action of the Counterclaim, "Award of Attorneys' Fees" is 
hereby DISMISSED. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any attorneys5 fees. 
5. All of Piaintifis' claims are hereby DISMISSED, with prejudice arid on the merits. 
6. Judgment in the sum of $ 15,080.18 is entered in favor of Foothills Water Company 
for reimbursement of taxes paid by Foothills Water Company, together with prejudgment interest 
in the sum of £20,986.58 as of July 26, 2000, together with post-judgment interest accruing at the 
judgment rate. 
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corporation, 
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Trust; Richard P. Dansie; Boyd 
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Attorneys: Raymond J. Etcheverry and Angie Nelson, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellants and Cross-appellees 
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Before Judges Thome, Davis, and Orme . 
DAVIS, Judge: 
^1 Counterclaim Plaintiffs Foothills Water Company, J. Rodney 
Dansie, the Dansie Family Trust, Richard P. Dansie, Boyd W. 
Dansie, Joyce M. Taylor, and Bonnie R. Parkin (the Dansies) 
appeal several of the trial court's determinations. Counterclaim 
Defendant Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association (the 
Association) filed a cross-appeai challenging other 
determinations. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND2 
J^2 This case revolves around a water system that supplies water 
to the Hi-Country Estates Subdivision. From 1973 to 1985, Gerald 
Bagley operated and made improvements to the water system, first 
in his capacity as an individual, then as a partner of Bagley and 
Company, and finally as a principal of Foothills Water Company 
(Foothills). In 1977, Bagley, apparently in his individual 
capacity, and Jesse Dansie entered into a well lease agreement 
(the Well Lease) , which allowed Bagley to connect the water 
system to Dansie's well and draw water from Dansie ' s well for a 
ten-year period. Water lines were installed to transfer the 
water from the well to the water system, as well as to transport 
water to property owned by Dansie. As part of the Well Lease, 
Dansie had the right to receive water from the water system at no 
cost through five residential hook-ups, and the right to receive 
up to fifty additional hook-ups at no cost. The Well Lease was 
amended in July 1985, giving Dansie the right to receive up to 
twelve million gallons of water per year from the water system at 
no cost for as long as the system was operable. 
J^3 This protracted litigation began in March 1985, with the 
Association bringing an action to quiet title in the water system 
against Bagley, Bagley and Company, and Dansie. Bagley 
counterclaimed under an unjust enrichment theory for 
reimbursement of costs related to the operation and maintenance 
of the water system, should title to the water system be quieted 
1. The history of this case is extensive. We relate only those 
facts pertinent to the issues currently before us. For a more 
detailed recital see Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association v. 
Bagley & Co.
 f 928 P,2d 1047, 1048-50 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), and 
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association v. Bagley & Co. , 8 6 3 
P.2d 1, 2-7 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 901 P.2d 1017 (Utah 
1995). 
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_n t hr Arsu^aaLon Defendantc nl so count en c 1 djmpd for 
enfoicement of the Well Lease 
]\/\ in June 198b Bagley created Foothills and began to manage 
the watei system through this entity Towaid the end of the 
yea: Bagley tiansfeiued all anteicst and stock m Foothills to 
Dansie and the following January Bdgley assjgned to Foothills 
all of his lights a elated to the watea system AJ so m June 
1985 foothills applied to the Public cervice Commission (the 
PSC) to opeiatc the watei system as a public utility and the PSC 
gianted a ceitificate of convenience and necessity The 
following yeai the PSC held late setting healings and determined 
that notwithstanding the terms of the Well Lease, m oidei foi 
the Dansies to obtain their fiee watei they would need to pay 
the pio lata costs for powei chloi a nation, and watei testing 
^5 Title m the watei system was eventually quieted m the 
Association In 1994, shortly aftei the Association assumed 
contiol of the watei system, the Association disconnected the 
watei lines to the Dansie piopeity when the Dansies allegedly 
refused to pay the costs requned by the 1986 PSC older The 
Dansies thereafter built a temporary watei system to service 
then property and claimed breach of contract based on the 
severance of the water systems In 1996, the PSC revoked the 
water system's status as a public utility 
^6 After neaily twenty years of district court determinations, 
appeals by the parties, and remands by appellate courts, trial on 
the remaining issues was held m eaily 2 0 05 The trial court 
then issued a Final Judgment on those remaining issues on January 
5, 2006, which (1) ruled that the Well Lease WP ^  en pnforceable 
contract and was not, as the Association had argued, void because 
of public policy or unconscionability, (2) dismissed the Dansies1 
breach of contract claims because the Dansies refused to pay the 
costs set forth by the 1986 PSC order and because the Dansies had 
failed to piove damages that weie proximately caused by the 
separation of the water systems or to mitigate their alleged 
damages, and (3) refused to award attorney fees the Dansies 
claimed undei the terms of the Well Lease A separate order was 
signed on the same day, fixing an award amount of $16,334 99 to 
Foothills for impiovements made to the water system between the 
years 1981 and 1985, the court having previously determined m a 
separate memoiandum decision that Foothills was entitled to such 
an award 
1|7 The Dansies appeal the dismissal of their breach of contract 
claims, aiguing that they did offer to pay the necessary costs 
and that they dad prove damages caused by the seveung of the 
water systems Furthei, the Dansies argue that the trial couit 
should have gianted them attorney fees under the teims of the 
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Well Lease. The Association cross-appeals, arguing that rhe Well 
Lease is not enforceable because of pub]ic policy concerns and 
the doctrine of unconscionabildty. The Association also appeals 
the amount awarded to the Dansdes as reimbursement for 
improvements, arguing that the trial court incorrectly relied on 
a prior PSC finding in determining that amount. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
^8 The Association argues that the Well Lease is void as 
against public policy and that it is also unconscionable. These 
are legal questions, which we review for correctness, giving no 
deference to the trial court's determination on the matters. See 
Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1996) ("The determination 
of whether a contract is unconscionable is . . . a question of 
law for the court." (citing Resource Mgmt . Co. v. Weston Ranch & 
Livestock Co. , 706 P. 2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985)); Russ v. Woodside 
Homes, Inc. , 905 P.2d 901, 904, 906-07 (Utah Ct . App. 1995) 
(reviewing for correctness the question of whether a contract 
provision was void because it violated public policy). 
%9 The Dansies contest the trial court's determinations that 
the Association did not breach the Well Lease and that, in any 
event, the Dansies did not prove amy damages that were 
proximately caused by the alleged breach. Our analysis focuses 
on the damages determination, which is a question of fact 
reviewed under a clear error standard. See Judd ex rel. 
Montgomery v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, ^ 34, 103 P. 3d 135 (recognizing 
chat "damages are a question of fact"); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 935 (Utah 1994) ("Trial courts are given primary 
responsibility for making determinations of fact . Findings of 
fact are reviewed by an appellate court under the clearly 
erroneous standard."). 
^10 The Association also contests the amount awarded to the 
Dansies as reimbursement for improvements made to the water 
system, essentially arguing that a finding in the 1986 PSC order 
is insufficient evidence to support the amount of the trial 
court's award. "When an appellant is essentially challenging the 
legal sufficiency of the evidence, a clearly erroneous standard 
of appellate review applies. . . . We review the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the trial court's findings and affirm if 
there is a reasonable basis for doing so." Reiribold v. Utah Fun 
Shares, 850 P.2d 487, 489 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
]^ll Finally, the Dansies contest the trial court's refusal to 
award attorney fees under the terms of the Well Lease. "Whether 
a party may recover attorney fees in an action is a question of 
law that we review for correctness." Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, 
4 
1| 46 , 04 P .3d 781 ( c i t i n g W a r n e r v . DMG C o l o r , I n c . , 2000 UT 1 0 2 , 
1| 2 1 , 2 0 P. 3d [108} . 
ANALYSIS 
IP Public Policy 
1|l2 The Association argues that the Well Lease is void as a 
matter of public policy. Specifically, the Association argues 
that the provisions for free water and water connections violate 
"the public policy that a water company may not charge 
unreasonable, preferential, or discriminatory rates." As support 
for this argument, the Association points to sections of the Utah 
Code which provide that charges by a public utility be "just and 
reasonable, " Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1 (2000), and that a public 
utility may not be preferential in its treatment of persons and 
entities, see id. § 54-3-8(1) (Supp. 2007). The Association 
further relies on the 1986 PSC order, arguing that the order 
determined the Well Lease to be "'grossly unreasonable. ' " But 
the Association is no longer a public utility, and thus, neither 
these statutes nor the PSC order is currently applicable to the 
Association.2 And we do not see any indication that the public 
2., In addressing the breach of contract claim, the trial court 
determined that the Association was required to provide the water 
"only upon payment of [the Dansies' ] pro rata share of the 
Association's cost for power, chlorination, and water testing," 
and that the Association was required to provide the water 
connections "only if [the Dansies] pa[id] the Association for 
those connections at the Association's usual charge for such 
connection." The court reasoned that such payment by the Dansies 
was required because "[t]he 1986 PSC Order prohibits the Well 
Lease from affecting the rates paid by . . . the association 
members." 
On February 5, 1996, the PSC revoked the status of the water 
system as a public utility. Therefore, from that point forward, 
the PSC did not have jurisdiction over the water system, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 54-4-1 (2000), and the 1986 PSC order was no longer 
binding. Thus, we now interpret the Dansies' rights and 
obligations under the Well Lease according to its plain language, 
which, as amended, states: 
Dansie shall have the right to receive up to 
five (5) residential hook-ups on to the water 
system on the Dansie property for members of 
his immediate family without any payment of 
hook-up fees and shall further have the right 
to receive up to 12 million (12,000,000) 
(continued...) 
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p o l i c y r e g a r d i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n of p u b l i c u t i l i t i e s s h o u l d e x t e n d 
t o agreements between p r i v a t e p a r t i e s c o n t r a c t i n g f o r w a t e r 
s e r v i c e . 
^13 The A s s o c i a t i o n a l s o a rgues t h a t t h e Well L e a s e v i o l a t e s 
" t h e p u b l i c p o l i c y t h a t t h e s t a t e ' s s c a r c e wa te r r e s o u r c e s s h o u l d 
b e managed by p u b l i c e n t i t i e s . " I n s u p p o r t , the A s s o c i a t i o n 
p o i n t s t o t h e Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n , which g i v e s m u n i c i p a l i t i e s t h e 
power t o pu rchase or l e a s e p u b l i c u t i l i t i e s , see U t a h C o n s t , a r t . 
XI , § 5 ( b ) , as w e l l as s e c t i o n 17A-2-1401 (7) (d) of t h e Utah Code, 
which s t a t e s the p o l i c i e s of wa te r c o n s e r v a n c y d i s t r i c t s , s e e 
Utah Code Ann. § 17A- 2-14 01 (7) (d) (2004) ( r e p e a l e d 2 0 0 7 ) . The 
A s s o c i a t i o n a rgues t h a t t h e Well L e a s e , s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e D a n s i e s ' 
r i g h t of r e f u s a l , v i o l a t e s t h e s e p o l i c i e s b e c a u s e i t p r o h i b i t s 
t h e A s s o c i a t i o n from t u r n i n g i t s w a t e r sys tem ove r t o a 
gove rnmen ta l e n t i t y . Again, n e i t h e r of t h e s e s o u r c e s show a 
p u b l i c p o l i c y to p r e v e n t t h e type of p r i v a t e c o n t r a c t e n t e r e d 
i n t o h e r e . I n s t e a d , such c o n t r a c t s can h a r m o n i o u s l y c o e x i s t w i t h 
t h e s e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s w i t h o u t f r u s t r a t i n g 
p u b l i c p o l i c y . Thus , c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of p u b l i c p o l i c y do n o t 
r e n d e r t h e Well Lease v o i d . 
I I . U n c o n s c i o n a b i l i t y 
1|l4 The A s s o c i a t i o n a r g u e s t h a t t h e Well Lease i s a l s o v o i d due 
t o u n c o n s c i o n a b i l i t y . The b a s i s f o r t h i s a rgument i s t h e Wel l 
Lease p r o v i s i o n s f o r p e r p e t u a l f r e e w a t e r and w a t e r c o n n e c t i o n s . 
But " [ e jven i f a c o n t r a c t term i s u n r e a s o n a b l e o r more 
a d v a n t a g e o u s to one p a r t y , t h e c o n t r a c t , w i t h o u t m o r e , i s n o t 
u n c o n s c i o n a b l e - - t h e t e rms must be ' s o o n e - s i d e d a s t o o p p r e s s 
. . . an i n n o c e n t p a r t y . ' " Ryan v . D a n ' s Food S t o r e s , I n c . ; 97 2 
P . 2 d 395, 402 (Utah 1998) (quo t ing Sosa v . P a u l o s , 924 P . 2 d 357, 
361 (Utah 1996) ) . 
^115 N e a r l y a l l of t h e A s s o c i a t i o n ' s a r g u m e n t s c e n t e r on t h e 
a l l e g e d c u r r e n t v a l u e s of t he o b l i g a t i o n s and b e n e f i t s u n d e r t h e 
Well L e a s e . However, w h i l e no t s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e c u r r e n t 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s would s u p p o r t a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t , o u r f o c u s i s on 
t h e t ime a t which t h e Well Lease was i n i t i a l l y e n t e r e d i n t o . See 
R e s o u r c e Mgmt. Co. v . Weston Ranch & L i v e s t o c k Co. , 70 6 P. 2 d 
2. (..,continued) 
gallons of water per year from the combined 
water system at no cost for culinary and yard 
irrigation use . . . . 
The Well Lease also provides: "Dansie shall further have the 
right to receive up to fifty (50) residential hook-ups onto the 
water system on the Dansie property for which no hook-up fees 
will be charged." 
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^028, j n ^ (nir^ 1985^ ("Oidniai ily the Tau ness oC a conluict 
should be determined in light o[ the en i cumstunces as Lne> 
oisted at the time of the mating Unconsci onabi lity 
cannot be demonstrated by hindsight " (mteanal quotation maiks 
omitted)) Behns Bar V Ranch v Hufh 664 P 2d 455 463 (Utah 
1983) ("The deteimmat j on of whethei a contiact is unconscionable 
is usually made with respect to the conditions that oisted at 
the time the contiact was made and vuthout regaid foi the 
parties1 subsequent conduct and dealings ' ) The Association's 
only aigument concerning the circumstances m 19 7 7 is that the 
Association did not need watei fiom the Dansie well But the 
Association concedes that at the time the Well Lease was entered 
into, Bagley and Dansie had plans foi a futuie subdivision which 
may have been the pumary reason foi the Well Lease Thus, 
Bagley did leceive a potentially valuable benefit under the 
contiact and without moie facts regaidmg the e n cumstances m 
1977 we cannot say theie is necessaiily 'an overall imbalance m 
the obligations and lights imposed by the baigam,,J oi that the 
terms are 'so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an 
innocent pai ty " Behns Bar V Ranch 664 P 2d at 4 62 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) Thus we decline to declaie the Well 
Lease void due to unconscionability 4 
3 An imbalance m the obligations and rights of the parties is 
only one factor to be used m determining unconscionability See 
Bekms Bar V Ranch v Huth, 664 P 2d 455, 461 62 (Utah 1983) A 
simple imbalance m the contract terms, without moie, does not 
invalidate a contract See id at 459 ("With a few exceptions, 
it is still axiomatic m contract law that persons dealing at 
arm's length aie entitled to contract on the^i own terms without 
the intervention of the courts for the purpose of relieving one 
side or the other from the effects of a bad bargain Parties 
should be permitted to enter into contracts that actually may be 
unreasonable or which may lead to haidship on one side " 
(citation and internal quotation maiks omitted)) 
4 The Association also argues that the Well Lease is 
unconscionable as applied to it because it was nevei a party to 
the Well Lease and is not a successoi or an assign of Bagley 
Although we see nothing m the lecoid to indicate that the 
Association was ever a party to the Well Lease, the Association 
has failed to preserve this aigument We have leviewed the 
record lefeiences supplied by the Association, but we see no 
place wheie this argument was pieserved See State v Brown, 856 
P 2d 358 361 (Utah Ct App 1993) ("Utah courts requiie specific 
objections m older to bring all claimed enois to the trial 
court's attention to give the couit an oppoitunity to coriect the 
eriors if appiopnate An oblique leference to an issue m 
(continued ) 
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III. Breach of the WeJJ Lease 
|^]6 The Dansies allege that the trial court erred by dismissing 
their breach of contract claims, which were based on the 
Association severing the two water systems. In dismissing the 
claims, the trial court relied on the 1986 PSC order--the 
Association was a public utility and the PSC did have 
jurisdiction over the Association at the time the alleged breach 
occurred--and determined that because the Dansies had refused to 
pay the required fees, the Association did not breach its 
obligations under the Weil Lease by severing the water systems. 
The court further determined that the Dansies had failed to prove 
damages proximately caused by the alleged breach. We affirm the 
dismissal of the breach of contract claims based on this failure 
to prove damages . 
1)17 The trial court determined: "The Dansies failed to prove 
any damages proximately caused by the separation of the two water 
systems. The Dansies further failed to mitigate any other 
alleged damages." This determination was based on findings that 
(1) " [t]he Dansies had several water sources to draw from when 
the Association disconnected its water system"; (2) "[t]he 
Dansies allowed their Lot 51 orchard to die from lack of 
watering"; (3) " [t]he Dansies did not lose money on the East 80 
property as a result of the Association's disconnection from its 
water system"; (4) " [n] o Dansies lost landscaping as a result of 
the Association's disconnection from it[s] water system to the 
Dansies"; and (5) the Dansies refused offers from Herriman 
Pipeline Company and Kennecott to serve the Dansies' lands. The 
Dansies do not argue that the findings do not support the trial 
court's conclusion but, instead, argue that the record evidence 
does not support these findings. 
|^18 "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a). "'A finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there is 
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed.'" State v. Walker, '743 P.2d 191, 193 
4, (...continued) 
the absence of an objection to the trial court's failure to rule 
on the issue does not put that issue properly before the court." 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Further, the 
Association has not argued any exception to this rule. Thus, we 
cannot consider this argument in our decision. 
onn^ni ^ q-TA 8 
(U t ah 1.9 R 7 ) (qu o t i n g United States v. United States Gypsum Co. , 
333 U.S. 364, ^ 395 (1948) ) . 
1(19 The Dansies' argument regarding damages essentially reargues 
the facts that were before the trial court. "However, a party 
challenging a trial court's factual finding must do more than 
merely reargue the evidence supporting his or her position; 
rather, the party is required to first marshal the evidence in 
support of the finding." Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 913 n.7 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citing Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 
4 32 (Utah Ct . App. 19 94)); see also Read v. Mutual of Omaha Ins . 
Co. , 776 P. 2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989) ("To mount a successful 
challenge to the correctness of a trial court's findings of fact, 
an appellant must first marshal all the evidence supporting the 
finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the findings even in viewing it in the 
light most favorable to the court below."). 
The process of marshaling is . . . 
fundamentally different from that of 
presenting the evidence at trial. The 
challenging party must temporarily remove its 
own prejudices and fully embrace the 
adversary's position; [the challenging party] 
must play the devil's advocate. In so doing, 
appellants must present the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the trial court and 
not attempt to construe the evidence in a 
light favorable to their case. Appellants 
cannot merely present carefully selected 
facts and excerpts from the record in support 
of their position. Nor can they simply 
restate or review evidence that points to an 
alternate finding or a finding contrary to 
the trial court's finding of fact. 
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, |^ 78, 100 P.3d 1177 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted) . 
1J20 In their brief, the Dansies simply set forth the evidence 
supporting their position, provide the opposition's response to 
that evidence, and argue that the latter was not credible. Such 
does not meet the "rigorous and strict" marshaling requirement. 
Id. 1| 79. Further, the determination of credibility is for the 
fact finder, and our review on appeal is much more limited. See 
438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, % 75, 99 P.3d 801 
("When reviewing a district court's findings of fact on appeal, 
we do not undertake an independent assessment of the evidence 
presented during the course of trial and reach our own separate 
findings with respect to that evidence. Rather, we endeavor only 
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t o e v a l u a t e whether t h e c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s a r e so l a c k i n g i n 
s u p p o r t t h a t they a r e a g a i n s t t h e c l e a r weight of t h e 
e v i d e n c e . " ) . Thus, because t h e D a n s i e s do no t a d e q u a t e l y m a r s h a l 
t h e e v i d e n c e , we a f f i r m t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s and 
c o n c l u s i o n s r e g a r d i n g f a i l u r e t o p r o v e damages p r o x i m a t e l y c a u s e d 
by t h e a l l e g e d b r e a c h , see Chen, 2004 UT 82, |^ 80, and we" 
t h e r e f o r e aff i rm t h e d i s m i s s a l of t h e b reach of c o n t r a c t c l a i m s , 
s e e E l e o p u l o s v. McFarland & H u l l i n g e r , LLC, 2 0 0 6 UT App 352 , 
U 10, 145 P. 3d 1157 ("A b r e a c h of c o n t r a c t c l a i m r e q u i r e s f o u r 
e s s e n t i a l e lements of p roof , one of which i s d a m a g e s . " ) . 5 
IV. Improvements t o t h e Water Sys tem 
^21 I n one shor t p a r a g r a p h , t h e A s s o c i a t i o n a r g u e s t h a t t h e 
t r i a l c o u r t e r r ed i n r e l y i n g e x c l u s i v e l y on t h e 198 6 PSC o r d e r ' s 
c a l c u l a t i o n of " r a t e b a s e " t o d e t e r m i n e the amount t o be awarded 
t o t h e Dans ies f o r improvements made t o t he w a t e r s y s t e m . The 
A s s o c i a t i o n c la ims t h a t d e f i c i e n c i e s i n the o r d e r make i t 
i n s u f f i c i e n t ev idence t o s u p p o r t t h e award amount . F i r s t , t h e 
A s s o c i a t i o n a s s e r t s t h a t i t i s n o t c l e a r t h a t t h e f i g u r e of 
$ 1 6 , 3 3 4 . 9 9 reached by t h e PSC was con f ined t o t h e c o r r e c t t i m e 
p e r i o d - -1981 th rough 1985. But t h e PSC o r d e r i s amply c l e a r on 
t h i s p o i n t , s t a t i n g t h a t " a l l improvements . . . p r i o r t o 1981 
[we] r e n o t i n c l u d e a b l e [ s i c ] i n t h e r a t e b a s e " a n d t h e n p r e f a c i n g 
t h e c a l c u l a t i o n of r a t e b a s e w i t h t h e l anguage " F o r i m p r o v e m e n t s 
made from 1981-1985, we f i n d a s f o l l o w s . " Second , t h e 
A s s o c i a t i o n a s s e r t s t h a t " i t i s n o t c e r t a i n . . . w h e t h e r 
F o o t h i l l s r e c o v e r e d some o r a l l of t h e improvemen t s t h r o u g h w a t e r 
r a t e s . " But the A s s o c i a t i o n p o i n t s t o no e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d 
b e l o w t h a t would i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e o r d e r ' s f i g u r e was i n any way 
i n c o r r e c t o r t h a t a p o r t i o n of t h e amount was r e c o v e r e d t h r o u g h 
w a t e r r a t e s . The PSC o r d e r was, as t h e t r i a l c o u r t n o t e d , " t h e 
o n l y c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e b e f o r e t h e c o u r t . " Thus , a l t h o u g h t h e 
o r d e r was no t b i n d i n g on t h e c o u r t , s e e sup ra n o t e 2 , t h e c o u r t 
was f r e e t o use t h e o r d e r as e v i d e n c e of t h e v a l u e of t h e 
i m p r o v e m e n t s , and t h e c o n t e n t of t h e o r d e r was t h e r e f o r e 
s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t t h e amount awarded. Hence , we a f f i r m t h e 
amount awarded a s r e imbur semen t f o r i m p r o v e m e n t s . 
5 . Moreover , t h e D a n s i e s do n o t d i r e c t l y a d d r e s s t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g r e g a r d i n g t h e i r f a i l u r e t o m i t i g a t e , i . e . , t h a t 
o t h e r e n t i t i e s had o f f e r e d t o s e r v i c e t he D a n s i e s ' p r o p e r t y . 
T h i s i s a n o t h e r g round f o r a f f i r m a n c e . See g e n e r a l l y Mahmood v . 
Ross ( In r e E s t a t e of R o s s ) , 1999 UT 104, H 3 1 , 990 P . 2 d 933 
( " [ U ] n d e r t h e d o c t r i n e of a v o i d a b l e c o n s e q u e n c e s t h e n o n b r e a c h i n g 
p a r t y ha s an a c t i v e d u t y t o m i t i g a t e h i s damages , and he 'may 
n o t , e i t h e r by a c t i o n o r i n a c t i o n , a g g r a v a t e t h e i n j u r y 
o c c a s i o n e d by t h e b r e a c h . ' " ( q u o t i n g Utah Farm P r o d . C r e d i t A s s ' n 
v . Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 64 (Utah 1 9 8 1 ) ) ) . 
o n n am ^ Q_ m 10 
V . A11 o r n e y F e e s 
|^22 The Well Lease contains an indemnification provision, which 
states: 
Bagley agrees for himself, his successors, 
and assigns to be responsible for and to 
indemnify Dansie, his successors and assigns, 
against any and all liability, losses and 
damages, of any nature whatever, and charges 
and expenses, including court costs and 
attorney[] fees that Dansie may sustain or be 
put to and which arise out of the operations, 
rights and obligations of Bagley pursuant to 
this Agreement whether such liability, loss, 
damage charges or expenses are the result of 
the actions or omissions of Bagley, his 
employees, agents or otherwise. 
The Dansies argue that because they succeeded in obtaining an 
award for reimbursement for improvements as well as a ruling that 
the Well Lease is an enforceable contract, the trial court should 
have awarded them attorney fees under the indemnification clause 
of the Well Lease.6 We disagree. 
1|23 We will award attorney fees under the indemnity clause of 
the Well Lease only to the extent authorized in the Well Lease, 
i.e., those attorney fees that "arise out of" obligations 
"pursuant to" the Well Lease, It appears from the record, and 
the Dansies point to nothing indicating otherwise, that the 
amount for reimbursement of improvements was awarded under an 
unjust enrichment claim and did not arise out of rights or 
obligations pursuant to the Well Lease. And notwithstanding the 
trial court's determination that the Well Lease was an 
enforceable contract, the Dansies were ultimately unsuccessful on 
their breach of contract claims based thereon. Therefore, we 
affirm the trial court's refusal to award attorney fees under the 
indemnification clause of the Well Lease, and we accordingly 
decline to award attorney fees incurred on appeal. 
!•- <-: •"" .'"•*-• . i •- 'J X:.'? '-{.-/r/io Y::hu>fi c:) v":\". \ y ^ " ' . . '"' 
?"' '••' ., !: •' ;• -0 (X b W)d bOVUj r'r •! y ) / ..• • 
v u - •;] -; .:.• -K;/, io'y->.'^0 r:c::J ,«v:! ;•'::.;-•; .-.; /, y ,- ., "' 
o '••-'. :....!! !'S,L. '.,,:,, :;{.Si1 yu D 2 ;LUu i ,' ' .v\v / ' / ) .. 
f
-6 . >L,4h.e„.A,s-saclat.ipn primarily argues that Attorney fees are 
~~inappropr 1 atlfe",TXW3^ T~lTt}e Well Lease because it. is not a •" 
" successor|VL;gJc.an^//-(agsign,, of Bagley. But as'-'we. have noted 
above, see supra no^e 4, this argument was not 'preserved below 
~lmd'^ve0~^^ it on appeal. 
fc.„U 
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CONCLUSION 
|^24 We affirm the trial court's holding that the Well Lease is 
an enforceable contract, being neither void as against public 
policy nor unconscionable. We further affirm the dismissal of 
the Dansies' breach of contract claims; specifically, we affirm 
the trial court's determination that the Dansies did not prove 
damages proximately caused by the separation of the water 
systems. As to the issue regarding the amount awarded as 
reimbursement for improvements'/ we see no error in the trial 
court's reliance on the PSC finding and affirm this award. 
Finally, because the Dansies did not ultimately prevail on their 
breach of contract claims and because their claim for 
reimbursement was not brought under the Well Lease, attorney fees 
are not appropriate below or on appeal. We therefore affirm the 
trial court on all issues. 
^25 WE CONCUR: 
William A. Thome J r . , 
Assoc ia t e Presiding Judge 
I, the undersigned, Clerk of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a 
full, true and correct copy of an original document 
on file in the Utah Court of Appeals. In testimony 
whereof, I have set my hand-and affixed the seal of 
the Court ^n
 p 
Lisa Collins 
Clerk pflfve^Getdil 
By 
DeptffaCJe 
Date 
^ wr 
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ADDENDUM 6 
MOTION TO MODIFY FINAL JUDGMENT 
FILED 
THIRB DISTRICT COURT 
2C0?NOV-7 AH 8: 32 
WEST JORDAN DEPT. 
p\v/ 
RAYMOND J ETCHEVERRY (1010) 
JULIETTE PALMER WHITE (9616) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile (801)536-6111 
Attorneys for Foothills Water Company, 
J Rodney Dansie, the Dansie Family Trust, Boyd 
W Dansie, Joyce M Taylor and Bonnie R Parkin 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
HI-COUNTRY ESTATES HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BAGLEY & COMPANY, et al, 
Defendants 
FOOTHILLS WATER COMPANY, a Utah! 
Corporation, J. RODNEY DANSIE, THE] 
DANSIE FAMILY TRUST, BOYD W. DANSIE 
JOYCE M. TAYLOR and BONNIE R. PARKIN, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
HI-COUNTRY ESTATES HOMEOWNERS] 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Corporation, et al., 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
MOTION TO MODIFY FINAL 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 0201007452 
Previous Case No. 850901464 
Judge Stephen L. Roth 
02229.002/4819-4585-7795 1 
Defendants and counter claimants Foothills Water Company, J. Rodney Dansie, the 
Dansie Family Trust, Richard P. Dansie, Boyd W. Dansie, Joyce M. Taylor and Bonnie Parker 
(collectively uthe Dansies"), through counsel, submit this Motion to Modify the Final Judgment 
in the above-captioned matter. This Motion is supported by an accompanying memorandum of 
points and authorities. 
DATED this 6th day of November, 2008. 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
RAYMOND J. ETCHEVERRY 
JULIETTE PALMER WHITE 
Attorneys for Foothills Water Company, J. 
Rodney Dansie, the Dansie Family Trust, 
Richard P. Dansie, Boyd W. Dansie, Joyce 
M. Taylor and Bonnie Parker 
02229.002/4819-4585-7795 1 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
/ 7^ 1 hereby certify that on this (p day of November, 2008, J caused to be served by first 
class mail a true and correct copy of the foiegoing MOTION TO MODIFY FINAL 
JUDGMENT, to: 
J. Craig Smith 
Lyle J. Fuller 
Matthew E. Jensen 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
215 South State Street 
Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
~7skM^^ 
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ADDENDUM 7 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO MODIFY FINAL JUDGMENT, 
JUDGE STEPHEN ROTH 
J Craig Smith (#4143) 
LyleJ Fuller (#10896) 
Matthew E Jensnn (#50693) 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
215 South Stele Street Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 413-1600 
Facsimile (801) 413-1620 
Attorneys far PlamtfflCounterclam Defendant 
APR 2 J 2009 
WEST JORDAN OEPT. 
m THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND TOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, "WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
HI-COUNTRY ESTATES HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Corporation, 
Ttewhff, 
v. 
BAGLEY & COMPANY, et aL, 
Defendants. 
FOOTHILLS WATER COMPANY, a Utah : 
Corporation, : 
Counter-claimant, : 
v. : 
HI-COUNTRY ESTATES HOMEOWNERS : 
ASSOCIATION, £ Utah Corporation : 
Counter-defendants. : 
: ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
MODIFY PTNAL JUDGMENT 
: Case No.: 020107452 
(Previous Case No. 850901464) 
Judge Stephen Roth 
The Court takes up for decision and ardor the motion filed by Defendants and 
Coxxntemtehrmxte Foothills Water Company, J. Rodney Dansie, the Dansic Family Trust, 
Richard P. Dansie, Joyce M. Taylor, and Bonnie Parkin (the "Dansies") to modify the final 
4o32-S157-9779/H1088-O01 1 
judgment Plaintiff and Counterciaun Defendant Hi^Country Estates Homeowner Association 
("Hi~Cotmtry7>) opposes the motion. 
The parties briefed the issues, and on March A9 2009, the parties, appearing through 
counsel, to wit: J. Craig Smith and Ly]e J. Fuller on behalf of Hi-Country and Juliette P. White 
on behalf of the Dansies, argued the matter to the Court The Court finds that the motion is ripe 
for ruling, and does hereby FIND, CONCLUDE, AND ORDER AS FOLLOWS, 
1. On January 5, 2006, the Court, acting through Judge Pat B, Brian, entered a "Final 
Judgmenta> The Final Judgment recites that "the parties stipulated, and the Court certified," that 
there were only four issues remaining for trial. The Final Judgment farther states that the "Court 
enquired of the parties on numerous occasions whether there were any remaining factual issues 
for trial, it being the Court's intention to resolve the entire matter at this trial, The parties 
represented to the Court that the foregoing issues "were the only issues remaining for trial.'' 
(Emphasis in original). 
2. Of the four issues certified as remaining for trial, three involved whether the Darisies 
•would have to pay certain costs associated with handling; and transporting water and also usual 
connection fees for water hook-ups, 
3, The Court ruled in the Final Judgment, among other things, that (a) the Dansies must 
pay tfyeir pro rata share of Hl-Couniry' s costs for power, chlorination, and -water testing in order 
to receive then 12 million gallons of water psr year; (b) the Dansies must pay a "fair use*' 
transportation fee for all water transported out of Hi-Country's Estates; (c) the Dansies must pay 
the usual connection charges for connections to Hi-Coratiy's "water system; and (d) the Dannies 
must pay the pro rata costs of transporting the water through Hi-Country's system in order to 
receive water irom Dansis Well No. 1. (Final Judgment p. 3-5). 
4£32~6157-P779/H!0$B-0D1 2 
4 The DansieE appealed the Final juagmeoiL. Fron, exhibit presented to this Court in 
connection with the present motion, it appears that the Dansies square}} placed before the Court 
of Appeals the issue of whether this Court erred in holding that the Dansies must pay the usual 
connection costs as well as their pro rata share of the transportation and other costs 
5. In an opinion dated March 27, 2008, the Utah Court of Appeals held "We therefore 
affirm the trial court on all lssuaE.9' Ri-Country> Estates Homeowners Ass :n y Bagley & Co , et 
aU 2008 UT App 105, % 24 There "was no directive from the Court of Appeals that the case be 
remanded for further proceedings. Petitions for rehearing and certiorari to the Utah Supreme 
Court-were denied 
6, Despite the Court of Appeals' mandate that the trial court was affirmed on all issues, 
the Dansies contend that certain language found in the appellate opinion, including, principally, 
footnote 2 thereof; make it incumbent upon this Court to modify the Final Judgment in 
accordance with the Dansies' interpretation of portions of the appellate opinion Specifioally, the 
Dansies contend that the Court should modify the Final Judgment to state that the Dansies do not 
have to pay usual connection fees or pro rata transportation or other costs for moving water 
through the Hi-Country system, 
7. Hi-Cormtry contends that the Court of Appeals' unequivocal affirmance on all issues 
m^m that all that is left for this Court to do is proceed to enforce the Final Judgment Hi-
Country also contends that to the extent the present motion might he considered amotion to 
reconsider the Final Judgment, the motion feils because there is no rule of civil procedure which 
would provide the specific relief sought here, and motions to reconsider are disfavored in any 
event, citing GiUett v. Price, 2006 UT 24 
4fi32-6157-$779/H*08B-OOi 3 
8. The Court concludes thai in the face of the unequivocal afSrmance b} the Court of 
Appeals, this Court lacks authority to modify the final judgment Sec Collins y Acree, 614 
So,2d 391, 392-93 (Miss 1993) (noting the "basic and dementaiy rule" that appellate affirmance 
"ratifies, confirms, and declares that the trial court judgment was correct as if there had been no 
appeal ") Upon issuance of the appellate mandate, this Court "simply proceeds to enforce the 
final judgment," and this Court's execution of the mandate ih "purely ministerial" Id, accord 
Amax Magnesium Corp y Utah State Tax Comm % 848 P.23d 715, 718 (Utah Ct App 1993), 
rev 'd on other grounds £74 P.2d £40 (Utah 1994). As noted m the Colhns opinion cited, "[u]pon 
any other principle there would be no end to litigatioa " Id 
9. in addition, the Court concludes that evec if there arguably is some inconsistency 
between the language of the body of the opinion and the ultimate directive of the appellate court, 
the appeDete court's directive governs See Amax, 848 P,23d at 718 Cltwhere the language used 
in the body of an appellate opinion conflicts with directions on remand, the latter controls.**) The 
Court concludes that it is proper to apply this principle even though the instant matter was 
affirmed on all issues rather than remanded. 
10. Finally, the Court concludes that to the extent the Dannies' preseoit motion could be 
construed as a motion to reconsider Judge Brian's Final Judgment, such motion would have to be 
denied. The Utah Supreme Court has "absolutely rejectedfed] the practice of filing posfjudgrnent 
motions to reconsider," winch "are not recognized anywhere m either the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure or tie Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/' Gilhtt v Price, 2006 UT 24, Tf 1, 6. 
"In our system, the rules provide the source of available relief.,. and wheoi a party seefo> relief 
from a judgment, it must turn to the rules to determine whether relief exists, und if so> direct the 
4832~6157-£779/HI()8&-0Dl 4 
court to the specific rchzf nvflflabk." Id 1 8, The Dansic8 have DO!pointed the Court to any 
Accordingly for the foregoing reasons, the motion to modify the fina] judgment is ^ M^Cefyfat*^ 
HEREBY DENIED. 
IT IS SO OEDEEED. 
Approved as to foinr 
a 
-=^ A 
J.iSSgSmit^' - \ 
Lyle J. Fuller 
Mstih&w E. Jenssn 
215 S. State Street, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84010 
Attorneys for Hi-Country Estates HOA 
I)AT^'tifa&^Myi&*tomL 2009. 
i . '•".'•'," (<•'-:'J" 
Raymond J. Btehcverry 
Juliette P. White 
Parsons Bchle & Latimer 
201 S. Main St, Suite #1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake 0^,1)184145 
Attorneys for Foothills Water Co, &RodDansie 
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ADDENDUM 8 
TRANSCRIPTION OF MOTION TO MODIFY FINAL JUDGMENT 
]N THE THJRD JUDICIAL DISTRUST COURT 
AND FOR SALT LAKE C0UNIY , S I ATE OF UlAH 
WEST JORDAN DFPARTMFNT 
FOOTH1ELS, et al . , 
Plai n t i f f s , Civil No. 02 0 1 0 7 4 5 2 
vs 
HI-COUNTRY ESTATE 
Defendant 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PREVIOUSLY-RECORDED PROCEEDINGS 
MOTION TO MODIFY FINAL JUDGEMENT 
4 Mdrch 2009 
BE IT NOTED, that the above -captioned cause came 
on to be heard on this, the 4th day of March, 2009; a; 
which time, the following was heard: 
* * * 
(fm) DEPOMAXMERIT 
333 SOUTH RIO GRANDE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
WWW.DEPOMAXMERIT.COM 
I LITIGATION SERVICES 
T O L L FREE 800-337-6629 
P H O N E 801-328-1188 
FAX 801-328-1189 
Debra A Dibble ; r .q p p P P 
• A T R A D I T I O N O F O I IAI ITY • 
] 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR FOOTHILLS WATER COMPANY, J. RODNEY DANSIE, 
DANSIE FAMILY TRUST, AND THE WILLETTl PARTIES: 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: We're here in the matter of 
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners' Association versus 
Bagley & Company, and on the motion to modify final 
judgement by the defendants and counterclaim plaintiffs 
in this matter. 
And if you'll make your appearances? 
MS. WHITE: Juliette White; Parsons, Behle & 
Latimer, on behalf of Foothills Water Company, J. 
Rodney Dansie, the Dansie Family Trust, and the 
Willetti parties. 
MR. SMITH: Craig Smith and Lyie Fuller on 
behalf of the Hi-Country Estate Homeowner's 
Association. 
Mr. Fuller and Mr. Jensen of my office are 
listed up above that, but they are -- we — we are the 
counsel that replaced Douglas Perry and Dell Gardner, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
And tell me -- tell me the name again? 
It ' s 
MR. SMITH 
THE COURT: 
MR. SMITH 
Craig Smith --
Okay. 
-- Lyle Fuller, are here on 
behalf of the HOA. 
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THE COURT: Okay. And that heJps. Okay. 
MR. SMITH: I know there's been a lot of --
THE COURT: There have been a lot of --
MR. SMITH: -- parties, a lot of attorneys 
on this, and it's gone on for a lot of years. So I 
know there's a lot of players. 
THE COURT: The only thing I can tell you 
is, by coincidence, today, the only other case that I 
have, that's anywhere near this old, we had a hearing 
on this morning as well. 
It's the Menzies case, which has been going 
on since 1988. 
in the hall 
MR. SMITH: Yeah. We saw the TV crews out 
THE COURT: Yean. 
MR. SMITH: -- circling around. 
THE COURT: So they weren't here for you, I 
take it? 
MR. SMITH: No. That was good. 
THE COURT: That is good. That's always 
good . 
Okay . 
You know, I appreciate the briefing that's 
been done on this. It's quite professionally done. 
And very useful, as well. 
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And I've i e a d e ve r y t h i n o vou ' v e O I V P n me . 
2 and the case law cited as well, and 1 think I'm ready 
31 to hear argument on this. 
4 1 I may have some questions for you as we go 
51 along as well, so. 
6 Ms. White? I think that it's your motion. 
7 1 And let's hear what you have to say here. 
8 1 MS. WHITE: Good morning, Your Honor. 
9 We are here before this Court today to seek 
10 a modification of the final judgement in this matter, 
11 to reflect the holdings of the Utah Court of A.ppeals 
12 regarding the terms of a well lease agreement and the 
13 applicability of an order from 1986 that was issued by 
14 the Public Services Commission, which I'll be referring 
151 to as the PSC. 
16 The recent Utah Court of Appeals opinion at 
17 issue here, which is 2008 Utah AP 105, held that the 
18 PSC's 1986 order no longer applied to the well lease, 
19 because the PSC no longer had jurisdiction over the --
20 the water company in the association; and therefore, 
21 could no longer be relied upon to modify the terms of 
22 their -- of that agreement. 
23 Instead, the well lease must be interpreted 
24 according to its plain language. And that's what we 
25 seek now, is a modification of the final judgement in 
70:18:42 
6 
]l this matter, that reflects the fact that the plain 
2 language of the well lease must be enforced. 
3 I This case has a long and complicated 
41 history. Only parts of that history are relevant for 
5 purposes of understanding the basis for today's motion. 
6 And if it please the Court, I would like to provide a 
7 brief overview of the relevant aspects of that history. 
8 The facts of this case began over 30 years 
9 ago, in 1977, with the well lease and water line 
10 extension agreement which was between Jesse Dansie, the 
11 owner of several wells, and Gerald Bag1ey, who was the 
12 operator of the water system for the Hi-Country Estates 
13 I Homeowners' Association, which we may refer to as the 
14 I HOA, or the Homeowners' Association today. 
15 In 2 ° 7 7 , Mr. Dansie and Mr. Bagley signed 
16 that well lease which gave Mr. Bagley the right to 
17 obtain water from Mr. Dansie's wells for use in the 
18 Association's water system. 
19 At that time, Mr. Bagley was operating the 
20 water system. 
21 The well lease also provided Mr. Dansie with 
22 1 certain rights; such as -- which include the right to 
23 receive reasonable amounts of water from the water 
24 system, through five residential hook-ups, for members 
25 of his immediate family, without any payment of hook-up 
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fees. For c u J i n a r y a n d yard uses, at no c o s t 
2 It also provided the right to receive up to 
3 50 additional hook-ups, for residential hook-ups to the 
4 water system, for which no hook-up fees would be 
5 charged. 
6 In June of 1965, the Foothills Water 
7 Association -- Foothills Water Company, which had then 
8 taken over the operation of that water system, applied 
9 1 to the PSC to operate as a public utility, and for an 
10 1 order requesting approved water base. 
11 They got an interim order establishing 
12 in-rates, and granting a certificate of convenience and 
13 necessity in 1985. 
14 On July 3rd of 1985, Mr. Bagley and 
15 J Mr. Dansie amended the w^]1 lease to clarify some 
16 language in it, and to add the following provisions: 
17 Specifically, that the Dansies shall have 
18 the right to receive up to 12 million gallons of water 
19 per year from the combined water system at no cost, for 
20 culinary and irrigation use. 
21 And secondly, that the Dansies shall have 
22 1 the right to use any excess water from well number one, 
23 one of the wells subject to the water lease agreement, 
24 that was not required or being used by Mr. Bagley or by 
25 customers of Hi-Country Estates. 
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2 to pay the incrementa J pumping power costs associated 
3 I with producing that excess water. 
4 Also, in 1985, the Hi-Country Estates 
5 Homeowners' Association filed an action to quiet title 
6 in the water system serving the association. Which was 
7 still being operated at that time, like I've mentioned 
81 before, by the Foothills Water Company. 
9 This was the first legal action filed in the 
10 matter. 
11 In 1986, the PSC issued a report and an 
12 J order regarding the certificate of convenience and 
13 I necessity for the Foothills Water Company. 
14 That 1986 order is the issue -- the subject 
151 of today's hearing as well. It contained numerous 
161 findings regarding the well lease, and also set rates 
17 J for the provision of water to Association residents at 
18 that time. 
19 One of the -- among other things, the 1986 
20 order was highly critical of the well lease agreement. 
211 Called it grossly unreasonable, and concluded that the 
22 association should not bear the costs of that well 
23 1 lease. 
24 In 1996, however, 10 years later, the PSC 
25 revoked its jurisdiction over the Association's water 
I 
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9 
1{ system, and c a n c e l ] e d their c e r t i f i c a t e of c o n v e n i e n c e 
2 and n e c e s s i t y at the r e q u e s t of the A s s o c i a t i o n 
3 T h e 1 9 9 6 order s p e c i f i c a l l y n o t e d that w h i l e 
4 I the a s s o c i a t i o n did p r o v i d e a l i m i t e d n u m b e r of 
5 n o n - m e m b e r s w i t h s e r v i c e s p u r s u a n t to s p e c i f i c 
6 1 c o n t r a c t s , it did not serve t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c and, 
7I t h e r e f o r e , it w a s o u t s i d e of the P S C ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
8 I In v a r i o u s o r d e r s and a p p e l l a t e o p i n i o n s 
91 d u r i n g the p e n d e n c y of this c a s e , the v a l i d i t y and 
10 enforceability of the well lease agreement has been 
111 debated, and ultimately it's been upheld. 
12 1 What the Dansies seek now is a modification 
13 1 of the final judgement of the? Trial Court, so that it 
14I conforms with the reasoning and the holdings of the 
15 r e c e n t d e c i s i o n b y the Utah C o u r t of A p p e a l s . 
16 1 In its final judgement, the Trial Court made 
17 1 three findings that are relevant to the present motion: 
18 First, the Trial Court, once again, held 
19 that the well lease was valid and enforceable, and not 
201 void as against public policy or because it was 
21 [ u n c o n s c i o n a b l e ; 
22 Second, the Trial Court held that the PSC ' s 
23 1986 order prohibited the well lease from affecting the 
24 1 rates paid by the Association's members. 
25 This is very similar to the holding of the 
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PSC itself in its ] 9 86 ordei; 
2I And third, the Trial Court concluded that, 
3 despite the plain language of the well lease, allowing 
4 the Dansies certain rights to free hook-ups and free 
5 water, the Trial Court would nonetheless order the 
6 Dansies to pay their prorated share of the costs for 
7 power, chlorination and water testing, fair use 
8 transportation fees, and the full cost of re-connecting 
9 the system. 
10 Both parties appealed the Trial Court's 
11 final judgement, and on appeal, the Utah Court of 
12 Appeals upheld the well lease agreement as valid and 
13 en forceable. 
14 The Court of Appeals also held that because 
15 the 1966 PSC order no longer applied, the well lease 
16 must be interpreted according to its plain language. 
17 The specific reasoning of the Court of 
18 Appeals is found in paragraph 12 and Footnote 2 of the 
19 opini on. 
20 1 As a foundation to their ruling that the 
21 well lease was not void as against public policy, the 
22 Court of Appeals held that the Association is no longer 
23 a public utility, and thus neither of these statutes, 
24 nor the PSC order, is currently applicable to the 
25 Association. 
11 
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2 1 Appeals went on to opine Lhdl it must interpret the 
3 Dansies' rights and obligations under the well lease 
4 according to its plain language, because the PSC had 
5 revoked its jurisdiction over the water system in 1996. 
6 As the Court of Appeals noted, the Trial 
7 Court's determinations regarding the Dansies' 
8 obligation to pay a prorated share of the Association's 
9 1 costs for providing water were based upon its reasoning 
10 1 that such payments were required by the PSC's 1986 
11 I order. 
12 Since that order no longer applied, the 
13 1 Court of Appeals concluded that the well lease would be 
14 interpreted according to its plain language. 
15 Again, later in the portion cf its opinion 
16 1 devoted to the Association's argument that the well 
17 lease is void due to unconscionabi1ity, the Court of 
18 Appeals again based its ruling on the plain language of 
19 the well lease itself, and its provision for free water 
20 and free connections. 
21 There could be no doubt that the Court of 
22 Appeals believed that the plain language of the well 
23 lease, granting the Dansies free hook-ups and free 
24 water, now governed. 
25 And that is what we ask this Court to do 
Of2 . 9 A . 170 
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now. To modify the Trial Court's final judgement so 
that that plain language of the well lease can apply, 
as the Court of Appeals so intended. 
In closing, we respectfully request that 
this Court modify the final judgement that was issued 
on January 5th, 2 0 06 in this matter, to render it 
consistent with the Utah Court of Appeals opinion, by 
removing the provisions of that judgement requiring the 
Dansies to pay for water that the plain language of the 
well lease allows the Dansies to receive for free. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Okay. Mr. Fuller? 
MR. FULLER: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. FULLER: As 'reliminary matter, as we 
were preparing for this, it appeared that our memo in 
opposition -- I'll speak into the mic here. -- our 
memo of opposition that was copied and was submitted to 
the Court may not have had the attachments with it. 
And I've brought an extra copy today to --
to give the Court, if that's okay. 
THE COURT: That would be helpful. 
MR. FULLER: I've given a copy to Ms. White 
before the hearing started. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
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II MR- FULLER: Also, Your Honor, rf I may 
2 approach. 
3 There rs an additional case, not cited m 
4 1 our brief, that we think is important and perhaps 
5 dispositive. 
6 If I could give the Court a copy of that 
7 I case as well. 
8 THE COURT: You may. 
9 1 Do you have a copy of it? 
10 MR. FULLER: Just this morning, I gave it to 
11 her. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MR. FULLER: Before the hearing. 
14 She had not seen it before then. 
15 Before I begin, Your Honor, does the Court 
16I have any questions for me? 
17 THE COURT: Not yet. 
18 MR. FULLER: Okay. 
19 1 I'd be happy to begin. 
20 I Your Honor, we very much take issue with 
211 some of the phrasing, if you will, used by counsel in 
22 her brief and in argument, saying that the appellate 
23 Court held something. 
24 And this goes back to, I guess first year 
25 law school juris prudence, when we learn right away 
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that there is a difference between what the Court 
2 | actually did, and the reasons t ha t they did what they 
3 | did, which is set forth in the opinion. 
4 1 What the Court actually did here, in the 
5 mandate, was affirmed on all issues. 
6 Now, one reason why that's important is the 
7 very argument that they're making here today, and that 
8! they've made in their briefs, was made to the Court of 
9I Appeals. That was their number one issue presented for 
10 review. That's Exhibit A that I just handed to you. 
Ill That's an excerpt from their brief. 
12 We have their entire appellate brief here. 
13 But the fact is, their number one issue on 
14 appeal was, Mr. Dansie should not be able -- or not be 
15 forced to pay his pro rata cost s for transporting water 
16 through the system. 
17 That was issue number one. So it's not as 
18 if that issue was not before the Appellate Court. I 
19 reviewed the briefs, I reviewed the oral argument. 
20 That issue absolutely was before the Appellate Court. 
21 Nonetheless, they affirmed on all issues. 
22 Now, I find it curious, and instructive, 
23 that in the motion, that in the motion and memorandum, 
24 counsel for Mr. Dansie and his related parties fail to 
25 cite any particular rule of procedure or statute that 
15 
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Why is that important? Well, for a number 
of reasons, one of which is found in the Gillette c ase 
that I just handed to the Court. 
As the Court may recall, this -- this case 
had some notoriety when it came out in 2006. It was 
a --
The facts of Gillette are not on all four 
with our facts. I - - I concede that going in. 
However, this is the case where the court 
took to task attorneys who file endless motions to 
reconsider. And they had the memorable line in there 
about motions to reconsider being the cheap grass of 
the litigation landscape. 
Well, on page four of the opinion -- I think 
this is highly relevant. 
Again, facts of the case are different, but 
I think this statement of the Court is highly relevant. 
I'm starting in the middle of paragraph 
eight . 
"In our system, the rules --" meaning the 
Rules of Civil Procedure, " -- provide the source of 
available relief. They are, quote, designed to provide 
the pattern of regularity procedures that parties in 
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1 I the courts can follow and rely upon. 
2 "Accordingly, the form of a motion does 
3 matter, because it directs the Court and litigants to 
4 the specific and available relief sought. Citation to 
5 Rule 7, where parties have to state, in writing, 
6 succinctly and with particularity, the relief sought 
7 and the grounds for the relief sought. 
8 "hereafter, when a party seeks relief from a 
9 judgement, you must turn to the rules to determine 
10 whether relief exists; and if so, direct the Court to 
11 the specific relief available." 
12 In essence, what I would argue is that 
13 they've filed a motion to reconsider the Court's 
14 j udgement. 
15 In the case law we cite -- there's the 
16 Mississippi Supreme Court case, the Collins case, which 
17 I think is very instructive. And Utah law is certainly 
18 in harmony with Collins. 
19 But in Collins, they had a Rule 60(b) issue. 
20 They apparently follow the federal numbering -- federal 
21 rule numbering like we do. 
22 There, the Mississippi Supreme Court said, 
23 once it -- once a case has been before the Trial Court, 
24 and that judgement has been made and final order has 
25 been entered, it goes up on appeal, and it's been 
17 
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affirm e d , not reversed, not partial J. y t h i s , part i all y 
that, it's been affirmed, the trial -- when it comes 
back down to the Trial Court on remitter, the Trial 
Court's sole function at that point is ministerial. 
It --
In other words, there's no .more gleaning and 
picking over an appellate opinion to decide if this 
line or that footnote could possibly support 
overturning something the Trial Court previously did. 
Particularly in this case, where the Trial Court record 
goes on for literally volumes. 
THE COURT: Was this matter even remitted to 
this Court? 
MR. FULLER: I haven't seen the actual 
remitter. There was a petition for re-hearing filed. 
That was denied. There was a petition for a cert for 
the Supreme Court filed that was denied. 
THE COURT: The remitter says, in whole, the 
above entitled case was submitted to the Court for 
decision, and the opinion has been issued. 
So that's all there is. 
MR. FULLER: Okay. 
Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. 
And it's -- again, we -- we believe the --
the authored opinion that this Court must follow is 
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So what to make of this footnote, then? 
This curious footnote that they rely upon. And I -- I 
was fully expecting they would blow it up and have it 
on an easel here for us all to review. This is clearly 
their whole motion. 
Well, there's a couple of things about that 
footnote . 
One is, we can speculate all day between all 
the lawyers in the room as to what that footnote means, 
but I submit that, under the law, this Court is bound 
to follow the affirmed-on-all-issues mandate of the 
Appellate Court. 
We cite some authority in our brief. 
There's an older Utah case, there is some other cases 
to the effect that Trial Courts should not attempt to 
interpret and divine meaning from an appellate opinion. 
They should look at the mandate and say, What are --
what have we been told to do? This has an affirmed on 
all issues. 
Number two, I think that footnote could be 
read, as counsel alluded to, as merely interpretive. 
In other words, there were issues before the 
Appellate Court, such as unconscionabi1ity, breach of 
contract, and so forth. And the Appellate Court was 
19 
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review those as if the PSC order had never happened. 
We're going to just look at the language of the 
contract itself. Not the PSC order that modified the 
language, but the contract. 
Now, they're free to do that. They're the 
Appellate Court. They can do it rf they want. 
But the bottom line is, this was their very 
first issue presented for review. The Appellate Court 
affirmed on all issues. Re-hearing was denied. Cert 
of the Supreme Court was denied. And therefore --
THE COURT: Was tnere a motion for 
re-hearing? 
MR. FULLER: Yes. 
THE COURT: And what -- what was raised at 
that --
MR. FULLER: This particular issue, as I 
understand it, was not part of the motion for 
re-hearing. But Ms. White can speak to that as well. 
She knows. 
But I -- I don't think this particular issue 
was part of the motion for re-hearing. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you a question here. 
MR. FULLER: Sure. 
THE COURT: I've got a similar question, 
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she responds too. 
You know, I've looked through this, and it 
appears to me that -- that Footnote 2 -- I don't --
Let me say this as a preface. 
This is a case that's -- that has been going 
on for a long time, and there's been a lot of rulings 
in It . 
I went back and read Judge Brian's 
memorandum of decision that led to the order, and I 
went back and read a couple of decisions before, and 
I've read the -- the appellate cases on this. Not all 
of which had much to do with this, but I tried to get 
as much background as I can. 
And I will say this. I don't have all of 
the background that the parties have, and I suspect the 
attorneys have, even though you probably weren't out of 
law school when this started. 
Maybe you weren't either. I don't know. I 
was . 
But the -- given that, it does appear to me 
that Footnote 2 is -- is inconsistent with 
Judge Brian's -- that portion of Judge Brian's ruling, 
in -- especially paragraph three of his order. That 
says there -- there must be a pro rata payment. 
Pff-47-36 
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2 1 give back of the hand Lo that on some level. 
3 MR . FULLER: Mm-hmm. 
4 THE COURT: How do you reconcile that? 
5I 1 mean, I --
61 And 1 understand what you're saying in an 
7 1 attributive way. And that's -- that's not a bad 
8 argument, by the way. I thought that was subtle. 
9 1 But -- but my sense of it is, as I came back 
10 to it, is that paragraph two does appear to me to be 
11 inconsistent with -- with certain -- the portions of 
12 the -- of the final judgement that Judge Brian entered, 
13 that the -- the Dansies are now challenging or asking 
14 me to change. 
15 MR. FULLER: Right. And I would make a 
16 couple of comments directed to that question, if I 
1 7 could. 
18 One, in the final order itself, which is - -
19 it's attached I think to both of our briefs. 
20 THE COURT: 1 have a copy of it. 
21 MR. FULLER: Paragraph three, that the Court 
22 just referenced, talks about the operative position --
23 I'm sorry. "Furthermore, all water transported outside 
24 of Hi-Country Estates is subject to a fair use 
25 transportation fee --" 
22 
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2 to paragraph three of the -- of the judgement, I guess, 
3 itself. The final part of it. 
4 MR. FULLER: Okay. Oh, I'm sorry. 
5 And I -- in looking at paragraph three on 
6 page four --
7 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
8 MR. FULLER: There's a citation there to the 
9 May 17th, 2001 memorandum decision of the Court. 
10 THE COURT: Right. 
11 MR. FULLER: And -- and I think that's 
12 instructive in that, as I read this final judgement, 
13 what the Court is saying is this issue of whether the 
14 Dansies will have to pay pro rata costs, that's already 
15 been decided. 'that's in essence the law of the case. 
16 Which is an issue that we didn't spend time briefing, 
17 but I would assume the Court is familiar with the law 
18 of the case. 
19 But I've gone back and read that memorandum 
20 decision of May 17, 2001. And, indeed, Judge Brian had 
21 already decided, some seven or eight years previous to 
22 this order, that the PSC modification, if you will, 
23 appli ed. 
24 Now --
25 THE COURT: But -- but that --
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On this 
THE COURT: The issue was raised on appeal. 
MR. FULLER: Right. 
THE COURT: issue. 
MR. FULLER: Right. They raised it on 
appeal, and the Appellate Court -- I wish I knew why 
they said what they said in -- in Footnote 2. 
I really don't know why they said that. 
I'll -- and my point is, even if it appears 
inconsistent, it would be improper, on remand or 
remitter, if you will, for this Court to try to 
interpret what it was they were saying. 
r would often be the case, in 
litigation, often be the case that -- I'd had a 
(inaudible) partner tell me, when I started practicing, 
when you look at footnote in the -- footnotes in 
appellate opinions, the footnotes are for losers. The 
main body is for the winners. The foot notes are for 
the losers. 
Any time it goes back down, someone could 
pick through the footnotes and say, Well, that seems a 
little inconsistent with the ultimate holding. That 
seemed to be a little point in my favor; and, 
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1 therefore,- J want you. Trial Court, to modify your 
2 final order accordingly. 
3 And I -- I think it would be improper to 
41 ever reach that. 
5 Now, if -- 1 suppose the ultimate authority 
6 on whar they meant by that footnote is the Court of 
7 Appeals themselves. And maybe it -- it ultimately goes 
8 back up to them. I don't know. Eut all we do know is 
9 it was affirmed on all issues. 
10 And if I may address, just briefly, one 
11 other point. And that is the -- the authority of the 
12 PSC. 
13 I As a -- as a water company, we would argue 
14 that we're still under the regulatory authority of the 
15 PSC. 
16 What happens, there is an exemption from the 
17 1 rate and service regulation part, because there is no 
18 longer a commonality of interest. 
19 And, as we've -- now, we put forth in our 
20 briefing, they put forth in theirs, some back and forth 
21 on whether we'd go back under the PSC, depending on how 
22 the Court rules. 
23 And, of course, the PSC is not a party right 
24 now. They're not here to tell us what they think of 
25 all of this, but we do, in fact, believe that if the 
25 
grant their motion, t h e net effect would 
2 be we'd be back under the PSC's jurisdiction. 
3 We already know what they thank of the well 
4 lease, as Ms. White candidly admitted. They didn't 
5 like very much of the well lease agreement. And it 
6 made orders modifying it fairly -- fairly drastically. 
7 So we would urge the Court to deny the 
8 motion, to not reach the issue of -- or trying to 
9 divine what the Appellate Court meant. 
101 The fact is, this was an issue presented on 
11 appeal. The Appellate Court affirmed on all issues. 
12 So we ask this motion be denied. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
14 And just for the record, on that PSC issue. 
151 I thought it was an interesting argument, again. I --
16 1 this is where I find my entertainment these days, I 
17I guess. 
18 J Is I thought it was a very interesting 
19I argument, but I think it probably is a little 
20 speculative for me to get to -- to base a ruling o t 
211 Here is what the PSC might do. 
22 And, of course, if I -- depending on what I 
23 did rule, PSC, if you ultimately were under the 
24 jurisdiction of the PSC again, they might rule 
25 differently, one way or another. I don't know that. 
121:03:03 
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1| But I -- I'll just say for the record, that 
2 that issue, I didn't feel was one that I could make a 
3 ruling on here. 
4 So, Ms. White? Let me ask you the same 
5 question. The reverse of the question. 
6 And that is, the issue was raised on appeal. 
7| Paragraph -- or Footnote 2 appears to deal with it in a 
way favorable to your clients. 
I'll say that. I -- I went round and round 
on this, and I must have -- I'll bet I read it 15 times 
in conjunction with the final judgement that's at issue 
here . 
And it's hard for me to look at it as 
anything inconsistent with what you want me to change 
here. But the issue they're -- they've raised is, it's 
a footnote, in a -- in an opinion that affirmed the 
Trial Court on all issues. 
So that -- that's -- that seems to me a 
major problem here that -- that the Dansies have, in 
asking for the relief from me here. 
So could you address that? 
MS. WHITE: Certainly. 
And -- and you -- we also read the opinion 
multiple times to try to make sense of it, because, as 
counsel pointed out, Mr. Fuller pointed out, that the 
27 
II first issue on appeal was the question of whether or 
2 1 not the Dansies should be obligated to pay these 
3 prorated costs, in light of the fact that the well 
41 lease's plain language says that they don't have to. 
5 1 And the only place in the opinion where this 
61 was addressed -- and it is not just an Footnote 2. It 
7 1 also is in -- in paragraph 12 itself, where the Court 
8 1 says -- most of the way down paragraph 12 -- the 
9 1 Association is no longer a public utility, and thus 
10 1 neither the statutes addressing the public policy 
111 argument nor the PSC order is currently applicable to 
12 the Association. 
13j And so it's -- it's -- it's the foundation 
14 J for the Court's rulings here, is that, you know, we --
15j we are no longer dealing with what the -- with the 
16 effect of that 1986 PSC ruling. 
17 J And that the -- you know, we just -- we --
18 J when we read this opinion, what we see is that the 
19 1 place where they address this question of whether or 
20I not those pro rata costs should be imposed upon the 
21 Dansies is pred -- is first and foremost in that 
22 paragraph 12, that sentence in paragraph 12, and then 
23 it is explained further in Footnote 2. 
24 And that ultimately it isn't inconsistent 
25 with an affirmance, which is a point we make in our 
21:09:20 
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II replv brief. wnich is that )ou u i ] 1 still -- this 
2 doesn't change the ultimate lulmgs with respect to who 
3 owes what money, who bleached, who accrued to damages 
4 or any of that What it changes, though, is how you 
5 apply 
6 So WP had d well lease that was challenged 
7 as to its enf02ceability. Its validity On appeal, it 
8 was af fumed It is enforceable and valid 
9 And so the only -- and so you -- we're not 
10 changing any of those ultimate decisions All that 
11 would be changed is that the -- sort -- are the sort of 
12 the underlying holdings to one of those decisions 
13 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
14 MS. WHITE: And, you know, as to the -- the 
15 case that counsel brouaht thas morning, I mean I -- I 
16 don't believe it's on all fours. It's regarding a 
17 motion to reconsider, and it's not something that had 
18 been buefed before. 
19 I I think that in this situation, what we're 
20 talking about, with ~- with many of the cases that they 
21 biought up, is that, like I just said, we're not 
22 talking about an affirmance -- a change to an ultimate 
23 affirmance We're just talking about modifications 
24 that are necessary to render the plain language of the 
25 well lease applicable. 
29 
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2 you know, again, you know, the pro rata costs are the 
3 law of the case. 
4 1 I mean, this is an argument that would have 
5 been helpful to brief. 
6 You know, J -- the way we see it is that 
7 that issue was brought up on appeal, and it was 
81 addressed in the opinion. And whether or not they're 
9 right, that footnotes are for losers, the footnote 
10 contaans the heart of what the Appellate Court had to 
11 say to us. And so what we're trying to do is 
12 understand how that needs to be applied, and we believe 
13 that this is the way that it needs to be applied. 
14 And so, in closing, we could request that 
15 the Couit modify that final judgement. 
16 THE COURT: Thank you very much. 
17 I'm going to take about ten or fifteen 
18 1 minutes here, and I've -- and consider what I've heard 
19 here in light of the preparation that I've made so far, 
20 and I'll come out and give you a ruling on it. 
21 MR. FULLER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
22 I THE COURT: Okay. Court is in recess for 
23 about 15 minutes. 
24 (Whereupon, a recess was taken.) 
25 THE COURT: I'm going to give you a ruling 
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f r uJ11 the b e n ch lit i t, e n d I h o p e t na t 11 J 
2 I u n d e r s t a n d a b l e . b u t if t h e r e ' s a n y t h i n g t h a t y o u f u n d 
31 c o n f u s i n g , p l e a s e a s k m e for c J a r i f i c a t i o n . 
4 I understand this is important. To both 
5 sides . 
6 The issue here really is the issue of the 
7 provisions an the final judgement that Judge Brian 
8 entered in this matter, that deal with -- that require 
9 that -- that the Dansies -- and I'm referring to those 
10 counterclaim plaintiffs and so on. The defendants. 
11 That the Dansies were required to pay 
12 pro rata costs for transportation, and other pro rata 
13 costs to the association as -- in order to receive 
14 water under the well lease. 
15 The Couru of Appeals discussed this issue in 
16 a footnote, and -- and in -- in my view of it, and I 
17 say somewhat limited by my lack of long experience in 
18 1 the case, but my view, in terms of interpreting the 
19 Court of Appeals' footnote is that paragraph 12, that 
20 sentence to which the footnote is attached and the 
21 footnote itself, appears to me to come to some 
22 conclusions which are easily interpreted as contrary to 
23 those portions of the final judgement that requires 
24 those pro rata costs to be paid. 
25 However, the Court of Appeals did say, at 
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the end, in the c o n c J u s1 o n , " W e therefore a f f r r mi the 
Trial Court on all issues." And the issue for me here, 
then, is whether I have the authority to actually make 
any change in this. And ] believe 1 do not have that 
authority7, at this - - at this level of the Court 
system. 
There was no exception in the Court of 
Appeals' affirmance of the final judgement that 
applied -- that accepted costs of transportation or the 
judge's rulings requiring a payment to pay pro rata 
costs. The -- the Court of Appeals' final conclusion, 
affirming the Court on all issues, was unequivocal. 
The -- and the law is, from Amax Magnesium, 
that where the language used in the body of an 
appellate opinion conflicts with direction en remand, 
the latter controls. That is the final directions. 
And it also said that, on remand, the Trial 
Court has only such jurisdiction with respect to an 
rssue appealed as is conferred by the opinion and 
mandate of the Appellate Court. 
Here, the opinion was affirmance as to all 
issues, and there really was no mandate attached to 
thrs at all. And the reason for that is because the 
Court affirmed a final judgement. 
So there was nothing left for the Trial 
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to do at that o o i nt T h e Tiial Cn u r t had a]readv 
2 acted to impose the final -judgement. The Court of 
3 Appeals affirmed if. So there was a remitter of the 
4 case down to the Trial Court, to send it back to the 
5 Trial Court from the Court of Appeals, but there was no 
6 mandate. There was nothing that the Court, at this 
7 level, was directed to do in accordance with that 
8 opinion, because the opinion -- the final judgement was 
9 affirmed, without equivocation. 
10 Now, there may be, and there is in my mind, 
11 some request -- again, I'm not making a ruling on this, 
12 because I'm not as versed in what happened up at the 
13 Court of Appeals, and what's happened before. There --
14 there's a question in my mind, did the Court of Appeals 
15 simply miss the issue and -- and not realize that a 
16 1 decision they'd made in paragraph 12 Footnote 2 was 
17 inconsistent with portions of the -- of the final 
18 judgement? It's hard to come to that conclusion based 
19 on what I know here, given that the issue was directly 
20 raised and was not -- didn't appear to be in any 
21 ambiguous way. 
22 The issue was raised in these -- in this 
23 language, whether the Court -- the Trial Court erred in 
24 holding that although the well lease provides the --
25 that the Dansies are entitled to 55 connections and 12 
33 
miJ 11on gallons per year w11 hout charge, the Dans1es 
2 must pay -- must first pay for the connections, as well 
3 as the Dansies' pro rata share of the transportation 
4 1 costs. 
5 Clearly that issue was raised J n the Court, 
6 and the Court had that before it when it - - when it 
7 made this decision. So I can't go into this and say 
8 that somehow, based on the footnote and paragraph 12, 
9 that with that issue having been presented ro them in 
10 the docketing statement, and apparently followed 
11 through in the briefing and on oral argument as being 
12 one of the important issues, that the Court was unaware 
13 of it in reaching its final conclusion. 
14 It's possible. It's possible that the Court 
15 simply didn't realize the implications of coming -- of 
16 affirming on all issues, given the nature of the 
17 analysis that they made in paragraph 12 of Footnote 2, 
18 I but I can't say that is the case. I don't know what 
19I was in the Court's mind. That's something we've talked 
20 about here. I can't define it either. 
21 But -- and, in my view, in the face of an 
22 unequivocal affirmance of the final judgement, in its 
23 entirety, I do not have the authority to infer 
24 significant modification to that final judgement from a 
25 statement in a footnote, and the sentence accompanying 
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i i it, however contradictory to the Appellate Court's 
2j final conclusion that that statement may appear to be. 
3 It appears to me that the -- that the remedy here has 
4 to be to go back to the Court of Appeals. 
5 And I'm not saying that there is necessarily 
6 a remedy there, just was asking questions in my mind 
7 about what the -- what process is available. But that 
8 that is an issue for -- for a competent counsel to 
9 address, if a clarification can be sought. 
10 I suspect that my decision here may be 
11 the -- the launching place for another appeal on this 
12 issue, and I suspect that's not a -- a mystery or 
13 anything hidden to the parties here. 
14 But let me address one issue, because I 
15 think m i s is likely to go back up on appeal. 
16 In -- an argument was made here, somewhat of 
17 a collateral argument in my view, but an argument was 
18 made here, by the association, that Footnote 2 related, 
19 really, to an interpretation of the well lease in 
20 connection with the Court's conclusion in that section 
21 of the opinion. That the well lease was enforceable, 
22 and wasn't either in its public policy or 
23 unconscionable. And that the well leases - - that it 
24 wasn't a -- an interpretation or ruling about the well 
25 lease's reasonableness as the PSC had defined it, but 
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i I that it dealt solely with the issues of whether the 
2 lease was in its public poJ i cy or unconscionable. 
3 1 1 think the Dansaes provide an equalJy 
4 1 persuasive, or perhaps better argument, that the 
51 Court -- and I'm quoting, that the Court of Appeals' 
61 conclusion, that the 1986 PSC order no longer applies, 
71 is consistent with and presents a separate basis for 
81 its affirmance of the Trial Court's conclusion that the 
9| well lease is valid and enforceable. 
10 1 thought that -- that seemed to me to 
111 offset the other arguments, so 1 didn't -- and maybe, 
12I in my view, my limited view, somewhat more persuasive. 
13I But the apparent inconsistency is one that I can rot 
141 resolve here. 
15 1 thin}; what - - what the Dansies are asking 
16 1 me to do, from my -- from my analysis of the process, 
171 is really either to do one of two things that I can't 
18 do. One isr to modify the Court of Appeals' final 
19 conclusion. To state that the Court is -- the Trial 
20 Court is affirmed on all issues except that the -- its 
21 conclusion that pro rata costs must be paid for the 
22 Dansies to receive water under the -- under the well 
23 lease is overturned, and the matter is then remitted to 
24 the Court with the instructions to modify the final 
25 judgement in accordance with that opinion. That's 
10:54:00 
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a J]y w hat w o k i nri m e to do there. I can't 
2 1 modify that opinion 
3| In the alternative, what you appear to be 
41 asking me to do, if -- that -- that's more within my 
5 jurisdiction, is to reconsider the final -- this 
6 judgement, that is those provisions of the final 
7 judgement that aie at issue here regarding pro rata 
8 transpor - - or pro rata costs. And I think than the 
9 Gillette vs. Price case conclusively does away with my 
10 ability to consider a post-final judgement motion to 
11 reconsider under these circumstances. 
12 I think, to that extent, Price -- or 
13 Gillette vs. Price is on point, if the Dansies' motion 
14 here can be interpreted to be a motion to reconsider. 
15 So en both of those grounds, I am denying 
16 the motion to modify the final judgement, and I'd ask 
17 the -- Mr. Fuller, you to provide me with a ruling on 
18 this. 
19 And you'll let Ms. White take a look at it 
20 before I see it as well. 
21 MR. FULLER: Sure. 
22 THE COURT: Are there any clarifications 
23 that you need from me at this point? 
24 MR. FULLER: I don't think so. 
25 THE COURT: Either side? 
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MP. FULLER: Wo, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. 
You did very well presenting very difficult 
issues, over a long period of time. 1 realize these 
issues are very important to people still. I have not 
taken them lightly. 
Thank you very much for \o u r very 
professional --
MR. FULLER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The Court is in recess. 
(Whereupon, the recording 
was concluded.) 
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